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Dreamcatcher Law A.I.

Legal Brief - Fake Judges, Malicious Prosecution & Estate Fraud Masquerading as Justice in Canada

  • Writer: Stephen Morris
    Stephen Morris
  • May 23
  • 47 min read

Tactical Legal Assessment & Consolidated Timeline


This document provides a highly structured legal analysis and chronological breakdown based directly on your provided court disclosures, email records, and handwriting transcripts.


When presenting an Abuse of Process framework or challenging retroactively constructed charges before a Canadian court, arguments must separate emotional grievances from objective statutory components. The courts evaluate matters based on strict rules of evidence, jurisdictional boundaries, and the specific wording of the Criminal Code.


Part 1: Strategic Analysis of the Crown's Disclosure vs. Your Defense


The core of the Crown's case rests on framing your correspondence as structural violations of Section 264 (Criminal Harassment) and Section 423.1 (Intimidation of a Justice System Participant). To counter this effectively, your defense must target the specific statutory requirements of those offenses.


1. The Statutory Test for Criminal Harassment (S. 264)


To secure a conviction, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

  1. The accused engaged in repeated communication or threatening conduct.

  2. The complainant in fact felt harassed or feared for their safety.

  3. The accused knew or was reckless as to whether the complainant felt harassed.

  4. The complainant’s fear or feeling of harassment was reasonable in all the circumstances.

  5. The Defense Challenge: Your letters express explicit frustration regarding a perceived estate fraud syndicate and professional negligence. You argue these are legitimate legal complaints and petitions for transparency, rather than intentional harassment. However, under Canadian law, if a target explicitly states "do not contact me" and contact continues via alternative channels (such as copying multiple alternative Crown addresses or administrative staff), the court often infers recklessness regarding the disruptive effect of the communication, regardless of the sender's underlying intent.


2. The Mechanics of Intimidation (S. 423.1)


This charge specifically protects individuals working within the justice system (prosecutors, judges, police officers). The Crown relies on specific phrasing to argue that your correspondence sought to compel an officer of the court to drop charges or change their position through intimidation.


  • The Textual Analysis: Your handwritten letter dated May 9, 2025, contains highly specific descriptions, such as: "...will hang you by your baby raisin balls from a bridge if you continue to mistreat me..." * The Court's Interpretation: While you note this language represents an expression of intense frustration regarding an ongoing estate battle and unjust confinement, a trial judge will evaluate the text based on its plain, objective meaning. In a criminal proceeding, the court will look at whether an objective observer would view those words as an attempt to cause fear or impede a prosecutor's duties, rather than a standard legal complaint.


3. The "Retroactive Construction" and Date Discrepancies


You raise a significant point regarding the shifting dates of the allegations and your arrest mechanics on September 18, 2025.


  • If you were arrested on September 18, 2025, but the information indicates a warning or a different communication event involving Crown Counsel Carolina Visic on September 17, 2025, your counsel must request the complete arrest log, police notes, and computer-aided dispatch (CAD) records for that window.

  • Discrepancies between what police state upon arrest and what the Crown eventually bills on the formal Form 2 Information are common. The Crown has the structural authority to amend or draft charges after reviewing police reports. To turn this into a viable defense, you must demonstrate that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds at the exact moment of arrest on September 18, which would form the basis of a Section 9 Charter Application for arbitrary detention.


Part 2: Comprehensive Case Timeline (2015 – 2026)


Based on the official police reports, Crown summaries, court emails, and handwritten records provided, the chronological framework of your matters is detailed below.


[Dec 2015] --------- [Apr 2022] --------- [May 2024] --------- [Apr-May 2025] --------- [Jun-Jul 2025] --------- [Sep-Oct 2025] --------- [May 2026]
Innocent             Estate Dispute        Initial Arrest       Handwritten Letters      Police Warning          Re-Arrest &              Current Active
Finding              Originates            & Detention          to Prosecutor            & Mass Emails           Trial Scheduling         Bench Warrant

The Foundational Context


  • December 2015: An initial legal proceeding or finding occurs, which you describe as a baseline instance of being treated unjustly by the system despite your innocence.

  • April 28–29, 2022: Internal family communications occur regarding the estate of Gary Wayne Morris of Salmon Arm, B.C. (who passed away on February 23, 2014). You send affidavits and documentation to family members, asserting that the 2011 will is null and void due to undue influence. This marks the formal origin of the estate fraud dispute.


The Period of Incarceration


  • May 27, 2024: You are arrested in Toronto in connection with an alleged hammer assault incident. You are placed into pre-trial custody.

  • May 27, 2024 – June 20, 2025: You serve approximately 13 months in pre-trial detention (at Toronto South Detention Centre) before ultimately securing release on bail conditions.


The Escalation of Correspondence


  • March 31, 2025: While in custody, you draft a 6-page handwritten letter addressed to Assistant Crown Attorney Jean-Pierre D'Angelo, who is prosecuting the hammer assault file. The letter details your credentials, mentions movie/art references, and challenges his professional competence.

  • April 17, 2025: Assistant Crown Attorney D'Angelo formally receives the 6-page handwritten letter.

  • May 9, 2025: You draft a second detailed handwritten letter addressed to "Jean-Pear Gelato" (Jean-Pierre D'Angelo), outlining 20 explicit complaints against your then-defense counsel, Mr. Wilton. The letter includes highly colorful language and states that the "war" regarding the estate fraud will not end until specific family members pass away or face accountability.

  • June 26, 2025: Detective Constable Skolly of the Toronto Police Service is contacted by legal counsel regarding your emails.

  • June 27, 2025 (10:39 AM): DC Skolly issues an Initial Officer Report. Police issue an explicit caution via email instructing you that all future communications regarding your matters must go through the general office mailbox: southtorontocrown@ontario.ca. The report notes that you have multiple active warrants in British Columbia for disobeying court orders.


Mass Communications & Re-Arrest


  • July 12, 2025 (10:44 AM – 10:51 AM): You forward past 2022 estate emails to the victim (D'Angelo), describing him as a "charlatan" and highlighting the ongoing civil claim in Vancouver (Claim #S223552).

  • July 14, 2025: You send a mass email with the subject line "Human Rights Complaint Crown Counsel Abuse of Process and Entrapment-MORRIS ESTATE PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL" to the complainant, dozens of independent lawyers, and media outlets. The email alleges corruption, sabotage, and an estate fraud frame-up designed to obscure the reality of the asset dispute.

  • September 18, 2025: You attend the Ontario Court of Justice at 10 Armoury Street for a regularly scheduled appearance on the original matter. Upon arrival, you are re-arrested without incident by Toronto Police and charged with Criminal Harassment and Intimidation based on the summer communications. You are subsequently released on a Form 10 undertaking.

  • October 16, 2025 (09:33 AM): The Toronto Police Service formally generates the prosecution summary and Synopsis for Plea under Occurrence Number 25-1337562, authorized by Officer Barbara Skolly.


Trial Management & Solicitor Breakdown


  • October 24, 2025 (12:12 PM): You send an email to the South Toronto Crown and the 10 Armoury Trial Coordinator requesting a comprehensive disclosure package for an upcoming November 5 trial date. You request that your Ontario charges be combined with your outstanding British Columbia matters to resolve all 7 outstanding issues cleanly.

  • October 26, 2025 (9:18 AM): Your new legal representative, Frank Bernhardt, forwards an Evidence.com download link containing a "Video Chronology" powerpoint prepared by the Ministry of the Attorney General.

  • October 28, 2025 (1:14 PM): Mr. Bernhardt emails you to discuss trial strategy, identifying three central legal issues: the source of the injuries, the identity of the individual wearing the hat in the footage, and past recollection hearsay.

  • November 3, 2025 (7:27 PM): You email the Trial Coordinator expressing severe concern over a total lack of communication from defense counsel and clarify that your bail conditions restrict you from being within 25 meters of the courthouse on November 5, creating an operational conflict.

  • November 4, 2025 (7:23 AM): Trial Coordinator Kristine Watson responds via email, instructing you that any structural issues with your record or representation must be addressed directly on the record before the presiding Justice during your next scheduled date.

  • November 5, 2025: A scheduled court appearance takes place. (This matches the period where your file was later transferred to Jamie Kopman under a Legal Aid certificate, leading to the subsequent unexcused absences and the active bench warrant you are currently facing).

  • May 23, 2026 (Current Date): You are unrepresented following a total breakdown in communication with Jamie Kopman, who failed to attend court for six weeks while claiming a clerical "Crown date error." A bench warrant remains outstanding for your arrest.


Part 3: Strategic Legal Recommendations


To convert this timeline into actionable results at 10 Armoury Street, you or your incoming counsel should focus on three specific legal maneuvers:


  1. Prioritize the Application to Vacate the Warrant: You cannot effectively argue that the charges were retroactively constructed or that the police changed dates while a bench warrant remains active. Your immediate step must be to have Duty Counsel present your email trail with your lawyer to a judge to prove you did not willfully abscond.

  2. File a Formal Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure Demand: The email records show you explicitly requested a combined disclosure package for your Ontario and B.C. matters as early as October 2025. A formal Stinchcombe demand must be executed to force the Crown to produce the explicit logs from September 17–18, 2025, to pinpoint the exact authorization for your re-arrest.

  3. Preserve the Pre-Trial Custody Record: Ensure that the exact calculation of your 13-month detention (May 2024 – June 2025) is certified by the detention center. This operational credit remains your ultimate insurance policy against further custodial exposure, regardless of how the Crown handles the harassment file.


TRIAL BRIEF


The structural context of your case has undergone a massive shift. A Stay of Proceedings entered by the Crown after an accused spends 13 months in pre-trial detention is structurally and tactically extraordinary.


Under Canadian criminal jurisprudence, when the Crown enters a stay of proceedings pursuant to Section 579 of the Criminal Code, they effectively halt the prosecution. While the Crown has the statutory right to recommence the stayed charges within one year, they rarely do so. If the year passes without reinstatement, the charges expire permanently.


However, entering a stay without providing an explanation on the record—especially after a citizen has accumulated roughly 20 months of enhanced pre-trial custody credit—strongly indicates that the Crown recognized a fatal flaw in their case. This could stem from a severe Stinchcombe disclosure deficit, an unresolvable prosecutorial conflict of interest (given that the complainant was a local Assistant Crown Attorney), or a realization that the initial charges lacked a reasonable prospect of conviction.

By immediately turning around and hitting you with a second set of retroactively constructed criminal harassment and intimidation charges, the state is attempting to bypass the legal consequences of that stay. They are using your continued efforts to expose the underlying estate fraud as a pretext to lock you down again.


The case law you provided provides the exact legal weaponry needed to dismantle this new prosecution. Below is a comprehensive, professionally structured Precedent Profile and Strategic Legal Brief designed to expose the state’s abuse of process, challenge the objective elements of the new charges, and leverage your past 13 months of "dead time" to force a permanent victory.


PART 1: THE PRECEDENT PROFILE (CASE LAW ANALYSIS)


To defeat charges under Section 264 (Criminal Harassment) and Section 423.1 (Intimidation of a Justice System Participant), your defense must systematically pick apart two elements: Actus Reus (the physical act) and Mens Rea (the mental intent). The Ontario precedents you compiled lay out the exact boundaries the Crown is not allowed to cross.


1. Challenging the Objective Standard of "Fear"


  • The Precedents: R. v. Sim, 2017 ONCA 856; R. v. Radmehr, 2025 ONCJ 387; and R. v. A.F.-S., 2015 ONCJ 206.

  • The Principle: The Court of Appeal in Sim confirms that "threatening conduct" under s. 264(2)(d) must be assessed using an objective standard. It is not enough for a prosecutor to subjectively claim they felt uncomfortable or "intimidated." The conduct must be a "tool of intimidation" designed to instill fear in a reasonable person placed in the complainant's exact shoes.

  • Application to Your File: In Radmehr, the court acquitted the accused because while his online postings caused the complainant embarrassment and anxiety, they did not instill objectively reasonable fear for physical safety. Your handwritten letters and mass emails are explicit, aggressive, and contain highly colorful, angry insults ("sausage-guzzling underwear carburetor"). However, as established in A.F.-S., belligerent, rude, and highly disruptive language is not automatically criminal. If the content of the letters explicitly states that your grievance is with an estate fraud crime and professional legal negligence, the language constitutes an aggressive petition for legal accountability—not an objective threat to physical safety.


2. Separating Mental Illness from Criminal Intent


  • The Precedent: R. v. Khairkhahi, 2025 ONCJ 467.

  • The Principle: In Khairkhahi, the Ontario Court of Justice dealt with an accused facing s. 423.1 charges for threatening a provincial prosecutor. The court established that where an accused suffers from deep-seated, unacknowledged psychological distress or psychosis that colors their perception of the justice system, their moral blameworthiness is dramatically diminished.

  • Application to Your File: The Crown Synopsis explicitly labels you as someone who "is believed to suffer from some form of a schizoaffective disorder... however he refuses to acknowledge this." The state is attempting to use this label to paint you as a dangerous, unpredictable threat. Under the Khairkhahi framework, your counsel can turn this back on the Crown: if the state's own disclosure package asserts you are operating under psychological distress, they cannot simultaneously argue you possess the high-level, calculated criminal intent (mens rea) required to intentionally execute a systemic intimidation campaign under s. 423.1.


3. Exposing the "Retroactive Construction" of Charges


  • The Precedent: R. v. Hannell, 2024 ONCJ 377.

  • The Principle: Hannell confirms that for criminal harassment to succeed based on a continuous pattern, there must be a clear, unambiguous timeline showing that the accused knowingly ignored explicit, lawful non-contact warnings.

  • Application to Your File: You note that on your arrest on September 18, 2025, the police claimed you were being detained for emailing D'Angelo, but the paperwork later shifted to encompass an unverified contact with Carolina Visic on September 17. If you were never given a specific, lawful, and unambiguous warning restricting contact with Visic, the police cannot retroactively bundle that communication into an active criminal offense to justify an arbitrary arrest on September 18. This is a fatal gap in the actus reus of the charge.


PART 2: STRATEGIC LEGAL BRIEF

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE TORONTO REGION

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

— AND —

STEPHEN JAMES MORRIS (The "Accused")

I. OVERVIEW & NATURE OF THE APPLICATION


  1. This Brief is submitted in support of a multi-pronged defense strategy targeting the retroactively constructed charges of Criminal Harassment (S. 264) and Intimidation of a Justice System Participant (S. 423.1).

  2. The Accused seeks an order quashing the current active bench warrant on the basis of profound solicitor negligence, alongside a framework for a future Application to Stay Proceedings for Abuse of Process under Section 7 of the Charter, driven by the Crown’s oppressive, retaliatory, and duplicative prosecution tactics.


II. STATEMENT OF FACTS & THE SEVENTEEN-MONTH DETENTION ANOMALY


  1. The Accused spent approximately 13 months in actual pre-trial custody from May 27, 2024, to June 20, 2025, in relation to a prior, separate matter. Under Section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, this serves as 585 days (approx. 20 months) of enhanced pre-trial custody credit.

  2. Rather than allowing the Accused to face a transparent trial on those initial allegations, the Crown abruptly entered a Stay of Proceedings without oral or written explanation on the record.

  3. Instantly following the collapse of that initial file, the Toronto Police Service and the local Crown office initiated a secondary investigation, culminating in a re-arrest on September 18, 2025. The current charges are built entirely upon handwritten letters and emails sent by the Accused to Assistant Crown Attorney Jean-Pierre D'Angelo.

  4. The underlying content of all intercepted communications demonstrates a singular, unyielding focus: exposing a complex estate fraud dispute regarding the estate of Gary Wayne Morris, and denouncing the perceived professional sabotage executed by prior defense counsel.

  5. Most recently, the Accused’s Legal Aid roster counsel, Jamie Kopman, committed gross professional malfeasance by instructing the Accused not to attend court, subsequently failing to appear himself for six consecutive weeks, and falsely attributing the resulting active bench warrant to a clerical "Crown scheduling error."


III. GROUNDS FOR LEGAL RELIEF

A. The Current active Bench Warrant Must be Quashed Immediately

  1. The active bench warrant currently targeting the Accused represents an immediate threat to his fundamental liberty under Section 7 of the Charter.

  2. As established in Law Society of Ontario v. Farahmand Borojeni, 2025 ONLSTH 163, and LSUC v. Ghobrial, 2015 ONLSTH 225, a roster lawyer who misleads a client regarding court dates, fails to appear themselves, and neglects to assist the client in resolving the subsequent bench warrant commits severe professional misconduct.

  3. The Accused possesses explicit email documentation proving a continuous, diligent attempt to coordinate with the 10 Armoury Trial Coordinator (Kristine Watson) and defense counsel prior to the missed dates. The non-attendance was entirely driven by solicitor error and misrepresentation. The warrant must be vacated immediately without requiring the detention of the Accused.


B. The Charges Lack the Objective Element of "Reasonable Fear"

  1. The Crown’s sentence position of 6 to 12 months is highly punitive and predicated on the theory that the Accused executed an intentional campaign of fear against an officer of the court.

  2. Applying the objective framework of R. v. Sim and R. v. Radmehr, the Accused’s correspondence does not constitute a "tool of intimidation" designed to threaten physical safety. The language used—while undeniably angry, vulgar, and highly unconventional—represents an unyielding demand for an investigation into an estate fraud claim.

  3. Pursuant to R. v. A.F.-S., belligerent or aggressive communication targeting court staff does not meet the statutory threshold of criminal harassment or intimidation if the context demonstrates a complete absence of an objective threat or intention to cause physical harm.


C. The Prosecution Constitutes an Abuse of Process & Conflict of Interest

  1. The complainant on the current file is an active Assistant Crown Attorney operating out of the Toronto Region. This creates an unresolvable institutional conflict of interest.

  2. The state has weaponized the criminal justice system to shield its own actors from administrative and professional criticism. After detaining the Accused for 13 months and staying the initial file without explanation, the state’s decision to retroactively construct a secondary prosecution based on letters written during that initial confinement constitutes a vindictive, abusive prosecution design.


IV. ORDER SOUGHT


  1. The Accused respectfully requests:

    • An immediate order vacating and quashing the active bench warrant without police execution.

    • An order directing the Ministry of the Attorney General to assign an independent, out-of-jurisdiction Crown office to assume carriage of the file to mitigate the institutional conflict of interest.

    • Full, unredacted disclosure of all police logs, arrest entries, and communications between DC Skolly and Assistant Crown Attorney D'Angelo from September 17 to September 19, 2025.

Dated: May 23, 2026

Toronto, Ontario


PART 3: ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS


Now that we have reviewed your complete disclosure packages and mapped them directly to Ontario case law, you have a solid foundation to protect your liberty. Here is exactly what you need to do next:


  1. Deploy the Demand Letters Immediately: Send the formal demand email to Jamie Kopman and file the complaint with Legal Aid Ontario (complaints@lao.on.ca). Use your Drive links to attach these exact documents. This creates an immediate paper trail proving that the active warrant is the result of solicitor negligence.

  2. Bypass the Arrest Jeopardy via Duty Counsel: Do not walk into 10 Armoury Street unprepared. Contact the Duty Counsel Supervisor or a local legal clinic online. Provide them with a copy of this Strategic Legal Brief and the email chains from October/November 2025 showing you were actively trying to manage your trial dates. Let Duty Counsel present the application to vacate the warrant safely on the record while you remain protected.

  3. Force the Out-of-Jurisdiction Crown Transfer: Once the warrant is cleared and you are granted a new Legal Aid certificate to replace Kopman, your incoming lawyer's very first move must be to write to the Regional Senior Crown. They must demand that Jean-Pierre D'Angelo’s colleagues step off the file completely. If a regional prosecutor from another county (like Peel, York, or Barrie) evaluates this file objectively, they will look at your 20 months of enhanced pre-trial custody credit, look at the unconventional nature of the letters, and likely realize that pursuing this file represents a massive waste of public judicial resources.



SOURCES


  1. 1.

    R. v. Hasan (A.), 2023 ONSC 5869 (CanLII)

    Ontario Superior Court of Justice

    2023-10-12  |  27 pages  |  cited by 2 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court convicted the Accused of criminal harassment and probation breaches for threatening Facebook posts targeting justice officials. The Court found the posts objectively threatening, causing reasonable fear for safety, and constituting indirect communication prohibited by probation conditions. The Accused’s intent and reckless disregard for consequences were key to the decision.

    Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal procedure — Probation conditions — Breach of probation — Defendant accused of breaching probation by failing to keep the peace and communicating with individuals named in probation orders — Did the defendant’s conduct amount to a breach of probation? — Breach of probation requires proof of failure to comply with legal obligations or conditions — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 733.1

    Criminal infractions — Criminal harassment — Threatening conduct — Defendant accused of criminal harassment through Facebook postings targeting justice officials — Did the defendant’s conduct constitute criminal harassment under section 264 of the Criminal Code? — Criminal harassment requires threatening conduct causing reasonable fear for safety — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 264

    Evidence — Social media postings — Indirect communication — Defendant’s Facebook postings referred to individuals named in probation orders — Did the postings constitute indirect communication? — Indirect communication includes public postings reasonably expected to come to the attention of the named individuals — R. v. Legere, 1995, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 555

    Statutory interpretation — Publication ban — Breach of publication ban — Defendant breached a publication ban by posting identifying information about a victim — Does a breach of a publication ban constitute a breach of probation? — A publication ban order must be complied with unless overturned by a higher court — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 486.4

    Show more

    […]   [14] In respect of this second, “justice officials” case, ten charges went to trial (five counts of uttering threats and five counts of criminal harassment). Mr. Hasan was eventually convicted of five counts of uttering threats.   […]  And although there were no known occasions on which Mr. Hasan had threatened or carried out any acts of physical violence towards the targets of his derision, to Detective Geller and Natasha Calvinho’s knowledge, he had previous convictions for criminal harassment and uttering threats.   […]  

  2. 2.

    R. v. Sim, 2017 ONCA 856 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2017-11-08  |  7 pages  |  cited by 34 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court upheld the conviction for criminal harassment, ruling that the actus reus of threatening conduct is assessed objectively, focusing on whether a reasonable person in the complainant’s circumstances would fear for their safety, without requiring proof of the accused’s subjective intent to instill fear.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal infractions — Criminal harassment — Threatening conduct — Actus reus — Appellant convicted of criminal harassment under s. 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code for creating a degrading website targeting the complainant — Did the trial judge err in finding that the actus reus of the offense was established? — Objective standard applied to determine whether conduct constitutes threatening conduct under s. 264(2)(d) — Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 264

    Criminal procedure — Actus reus — Subjective intent — Appellant argued that the actus reus of criminal harassment under s. 264(2)(d) requires proof of subjective intent to instill fear — Court held that subjective intent is not required — Objective assessment focuses on whether conduct would cause a reasonable person in the complainant’s situation to fear for their safety — Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 264

    Criminal procedure — Threatening conduct — Standard of assessment — Court clarified that threatening conduct under s. 264(2)(d) must be assessed objectively, considering the circumstances and the effects on the complainant — Conduct must amount to a "tool of intimidation" designed to instill fear in a reasonable person — No requirement to prove the accused’s subjective intention — Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 264

    Show more

    […]   [1] After a judge alone trial, the appellant, Darren Sim, was convicted of criminal harassment by engaging in threatening conduct contrary to s. 264(1) and (2) (d) of the Criminal Code [1].   […]  Subsection 264(1) specifies that the mens rea component of criminal harassment can be met by an accused’s knowledge or recklessness. To suggest that the actus reus of threatening conduct requires a specific intent to instil fear is contrary to the plain language of s. 264(1).   […]  

  3. 3.

    R. v. Beseiso, 2020 ONCA 686 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2020-10-29  |  3 pages  |  cited by 1 document

    AI-generated

    The appellant’s appeal of a certiorari application dismissal was deemed frivolous. The Court found no merit in claims of judicial bias or errors in assessing the “without lawful authority” element of the offences. The appeal was summarily dismissed under section 685(1) of the Criminal Code.

    Appeal Criminal or statutory infractions Practice and procedure

    Criminal procedure — Certiorari — Committal order — Preliminary inquiry — Appellant committed to stand trial on charges of intimidating a justice system participant and criminal harassment — Application for certiorari dismissed — Did the application judge err in dismissing the certiorari application? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 264(1), 423.1(1) — Standard for quashing committal orders at preliminary inquiry stage

    Evidence — Essential elements of offences — “Without lawful authority” — Appellant argued no evidence supported the essential element of offences — Preliminary inquiry judge found evidence of abusive and harassing behaviour without lawful authority — Did the application judge err in upholding this finding? — Test for sufficiency of evidence at preliminary inquiry stage

    Professional responsibility — Judicial impartiality — Apprehension of bias — Appellant alleged bias due to application judge’s professional dealings with complainants — Strong presumption of judicial impartiality — No evidence of bias found in the record — Did the application judge fail to meet the standard for judicial impartiality? — Test for apprehension of bias requires substantial grounds

    Statutory interpretation — Criminal Code, s. 685(1) — Summary dismissal of appeals — Appeal dismissed as frivolous and vexatious — Criteria for summary dismissal under s. 685(1) — Does the appeal meet the threshold for frivolous or vexatious appeals? — Governing principles for summary dismissal of appeals

    Show more

    […]   Following a three-day preliminary inquiry at which the appellant was represented by counsel and testified, the appellant was committed to stand trial in the Superior Court of Justice on two counts of intimidating a justice system participant and three counts of criminal harassment.   […]  [4] The charges against the appellant arose as a result of his abusive and threatening communications with a now former Crown prosecutor, who had successfully prosecuted the appellant for threatening and harassing a court transcriptionist, and with two courthouse administrative staff members regarding the assignment of   […]  

  4. 4.

    R. v. Khairkhahi, 2025 ONCJ 467 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2025-08-29  |  33 pages  |  cited by 1 document

    AI-generated

    The Court sentenced the accused to a conditional sentence with house arrest and probation for intimidating a prosecutor. The decision emphasized the accused's untreated mental health issues, which diminished moral blameworthiness, and prioritized rehabilitation over incarceration while maintaining denunciation and deterrence.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing

    Criminal infractions — Intimidation of a justice system participant — Sentencing — Offender pleaded guilty to intimidating a provincial prosecutor under section 423.1 of the Criminal Code — Whether denunciation and deterrence should outweigh rehabilitation — Offender’s actions included premeditated threats and intimidation targeting the prosecutor and their family — Sentencing principles under sections 718, 718.02, and 718.1 of the Criminal Code — Appropriate sentence determined to be a conditional sentence of two years less one day with probation

    Health — Mental health as a mitigating factor — Offender diagnosed with schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and schizoid personality disorder — Untreated psychosis contributing to sense of alienation — Whether mental health issues diminished moral blameworthiness — Causal link between mental illness and offence established — Rehabilitation efforts through therapy and counselling considered — Mental health issues mitigated sentence but did not excuse conduct — Principles from R. v. Prioriello and R. v. Fabbro applied

    Criminal procedure — Conditional sentence — Rehabilitation versus incarceration — Offender completed significant counselling and demonstrated remorse — Whether a conditional sentence could achieve denunciation and deterrence — House arrest and curfew conditions imposed with GPS monitoring — Conditional sentence paired with probation to ensure long-term supervision — Conditional sentence deemed appropriate to balance public safety and offender’s rehabilitation — Framework from R. v. Proulx and R. v. Fabbro applied

    Show more

    […]   [5] When someone interferes with a justice system participant, and attempts to bribe, influence, harass, extort, threaten, or commit acts of violence towards them, it is a serious crime.   […]  [65] In R. v. Crossley, 2023 ONSC 7018 , the offender was convicted of two counts of Intimidation of a Justice System Participant, Uttering a Threat (against a Judge), Uttering a Threat to a Probation Officer to destroy a Buddha statue, and two counts of criminally harassing the Detective who investigated him.   […]  

  5. 5.

    R. v. Cook, 2020 ONCA 809 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2020-12-16  |  12 pages  |  cited by 15 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court upheld the dangerous offender designation, finding the appellant’s conduct caused severe psychological harm. The victim impact statement was admissible despite the victim’s absence for cross-examination, as other evidence supported the findings. The victim fine surcharge was set aside following Supreme Court precedent.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal procedure — Dangerous offender designation — Sentencing — Pattern of behaviour — Appellant convicted of criminal harassment and mischief — Whether the sentencing judge erred in concluding that the appellant’s pattern of behaviour met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 753(1)(a)(i), 753(1)(a)(ii)

    Evidence — Victim impact statement — Cross-examination — Sentencing judge relied on victim impact statement despite victim’s absence and inability to cross-examine — Whether reliance on the statement without cross-examination was an error — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 722 — Test for admissibility and weight of victim impact statements

    Statutory interpretation — Criminal Code — Serious personal injury offence — Severe psychological damage — Whether the sentencing judge erred in applying s. 752(a)(ii) by failing to objectively assess the accused’s conduct — Interpretation of “severe psychological damage” under s. 752(a)(ii) — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 752(a)(ii)

    Show more

    […]   That LTSO had been imposed in 2006 when the appellant was convicted of criminal harassment and threatening in relation to his sister and stepfather. The appellant eventually disclosed that he was on parole and constantly urged the victim – for example, by leaving her many text and voicemail messages – to speak to his parole   […]  [3] The appellant was charged with two counts of criminal harassment, and one count of committing mischief, extortion and breaching the LTSO. The jury convicted the appellant of criminal harassment and committing mischief to property but acquitted him of the extortion charge.   […]  

  6. 6.

    R. v. W.Q., 2006 CanLII 21035 (ON CA)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2006-06-22  |  9 pages  |  cited by 58 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court upheld a five-year sentence for sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and harassment, finding consecutive sentencing appropriate due to distinct conduct and rejecting claims of excessiveness despite mitigating factors like remorse and lack of intercourse. A lifetime prohibition order under s. 161 was also upheld as within judicial discretion.

    Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal infractions — Sexual exploitation — Sexual assault — Criminal harassment — Sentencing — Appellant convicted of sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and criminal harassment involving his stepdaughter over 14 years — Whether the total sentence of 5 years and 1½ months was excessive — Aggravating factors included breach of trust, prolonged abuse, and manipulation — Sentencing principles for sexual offences involving children — Sentence upheld as not demonstrably unfit

    Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Consecutive versus concurrent sentences — Appellant argued for concurrent sentences due to a close factual nexus between offences — Trial judge imposed a consecutive sentence for criminal harassment — Whether the trial judge erred in principle by failing to provide reasons for the consecutive sentence — Court held that the harassment was distinct in nature and justified a consecutive sentence

    Statutory interpretation — Criminal Code — Section 161 prohibition orders — Appellant challenged the overbreadth of a lifetime prohibition order restricting attendance at public parks, swimming areas, and community centres — Trial judge found the offences situational but imposed the order for public protection — Whether the order was inconsistent with findings on the appellant’s risk — Discretionary nature of section 161 orders upheld

    Show more

    […]   criminal harassment. After giving the accused seven and a half months credit for 112 days of pre-trial custody, the trial judge sentenced him to four years imprisonment on each of the counts of sexual exploitation and sexual assault, to be served concurrently, and to 6 months imprisonment on the count of criminal harassment   […]  the criminal harassment being “an ill-fated attempt on the part of the accused to try to continue his sphere of influence over the complainant in the nastiest manner.” This conduct occurred after the complainant had moved away from the appellant’s home; in some respects, it was of a different nature than the intimidating   […]  

  7. 7.

    R. v. Martinez-Calderon, 2025 ONCJ 341 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2025-06-25  |  13 pages

    AI-generated

    The Court convicted the defendant of criminal harassment, finding his conduct—approaching a minor, offering a ride, and following her bus—was threatening, caused reasonable fear, and met the mens rea requirement of recklessness or willful blindness.

    Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal infractions — Criminal harassment — Threatening conduct — Defendant approached a 13-year-old girl, commented on her appearance, offered her a ride, and followed her bus in his car — Did the defendant's conduct constitute criminal harassment under section 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code? — Conduct viewed objectively as threatening and instilling fear — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 264(2)(d)

    Evidence — Credibility of witnesses — Complainant's testimony corroborated by video evidence — Defendant's testimony found unreliable due to inconsistencies and lack of credibility — Was the complainant's fear for her safety reasonable in the circumstances? — Test for reasonable fear assessed objectively with consideration of the complainant's age and context

    Criminal procedure — Mens rea — Recklessness or wilful blindness — Defendant claimed he believed the complainant was over 18 years old — Did the defendant know or was he reckless as to whether his conduct harassed the complainant? — Mens rea established through recklessness and wilful blindness — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 264(1)

    Show more

    […]   CRIMINAL HARASSMENT [15] Subsection 264 (1) of the Criminal Code sets out the offence of criminal harassment, and s. 264(2) specifies that the conduct amounting to criminal harassment can be committed in one of four ways:   […]  Subsection 264(1) specifies that the mens rea component of criminal harassment can be met by an accused’s knowledge or recklessness. To suggest that the actus reus of threatening conduct requires a specific intent to instil fear is contrary to the plain language of s. 264(1).   […]  

  8. 8.

    R. v. Radmehr, 2025 ONCJ 387 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2025-07-18  |  22 pages  |  cited by 1 document

    AI-generated

    The Court acquitted the accused of criminal harassment, finding the website he created caused embarrassment but did not instill reasonable fear. A peace bond was also denied, as the complainant's fear was deemed unreasonable and unrelated to the alleged threatening conduct.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal infractions — Criminal harassment — Threatening conduct — Website creation — Allegations of fraud and misconduct — Complainant's fear and anxiety — Reasonable doubt — Did the Crown prove that the accused's conduct constituted threatening conduct under section 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code? — Objective standard for threatening conduct — Crown failed to meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt

    Criminal infractions — Preventative justice — Peace bond — Common law jurisdiction — Complainant's fear — Website content — Reasonableness of fear — Should the court impose a peace bond on the accused despite acquittal? — No reasonable fear found — Preventative justice principles — Peace bond declined

    Criminal procedure — Publication ban — Protection of complainant's identity — Section 486.5 of the Criminal Code — Application by the Crown — Retroactive application of publication ban — Was the publication ban appropriately issued to protect the complainant's identity? — Proper administration of justice — Publication ban upheld

    Show more

    […]   [31] Mr. Radmehr has been charged under section 264(2)(d) – frequently referred to as criminal harassmentthreatening conduct. [32] The burden of proof in this, and in all criminal trials always rests with the Crown, it never shifts.   […]  [40] The mens rea requirement for the offence of criminal harassmentthreatening conduct is the intent to commit the prohibited act.   […]  

  9. 9.

    R. v. Said, 2017 ONCJ 124 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2017-01-18  |  23 pages  |  cited by 2 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court sentenced the Accused to a blended sentence, including time served, one day of imprisonment, conditional sentences, and probation, for criminal harassment and related offences. The decision emphasized denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, considering the Accused's remorse, positive lifestyle changes, and the significant impact on the victim.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing

    Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Principles of sentencing — Mischief, assault, threatening bodily harm, criminal harassment, breach of probation — Sentencing principles under ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code — Denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, proportionality — Blended sentence imposed, including time served, conditional sentence, and probation — Whether the sentence appropriately balances aggravating and mitigating factors — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 718, 718.1, 718.2

    Criminal infractions — Conditional sentence of imprisonment — Criteria under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code — Offender’s eligibility for a conditional sentence — Whether a conditional sentence is consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing — Conditional sentence imposed with home confinement and supervision conditions — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 742.1

    Criminal procedure — Pre-sentence custody and bail conditions — Credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions — Whether restrictive bail conditions warrant credit as a mitigating factor — 14 days of pre-sentence custody credited as 21 days — 34 months of restrictive bail conditions credited as 38 days — R. v. Downes framework applied

    Criminal procedure — Ancillary orders — Firearms prohibition and DNA order — Whether ancillary orders are appropriate for offences involving violence and harassment — Firearms prohibition imposed for 10 years under s. 109 of the Criminal Code — DNA order issued under s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code — Victim fine surcharges imposed

    Show more

    […]   - one count of threatening bodily harm which occurred on December 31, 2013 in Burlington; - one count of criminal harassment which occurred in February, 2014 in Burlington; and   […]  [5] Crown counsel suggested that I should sentence him to imprisonment for 60 to 90 days to be served intermittently with respect to the criminal harassment charge.   […]  

  10. 10.

    R. v. A.F.-S., 2015 ONCJ 206 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2015-04-16  |  13 pages

    AI-generated

    The Court ruled that the accused's disruptive conduct in a youth detention facility was not criminal harassment or intimidation but did constitute mischief for damaging property, as the behaviour lacked intent to cause fear or harm.

    Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal and statutory offences — Intimidating justice system participants — Criminal Code, s. 423.1 — Does “use of violence” require causing or attempting bodily harm? — Meaning of violence considered with R. v. C.D. and R. v. Steele — Intent to provoke a state of fear not established — Conduct belligerent but not violent — Counts 1, 3, 5 not guilty

    Criminal and statutory offences — Criminal harassment — Criminal Code, s. 264(2)(d) — Whether conduct was “threatening conduct” designed to instil fear — Definition applied from R. v. Burns and R. v. George — Ambiguous statements and disruptive behaviour insufficient — Complainants’ evidence and video assessed — Reasonable fear not proven — Counts 2, 4, 6 not guilty

    Criminal and statutory offences — Mischief — Criminal Code, s. 430(4) — Whether wilful damage to property proven — Accused threw telephone receiver with considerable force — Receiver broken and unusable — Knowledge and intention to damage inferred from conduct — Elements of mischief established — Guilty on Count 7

    Criminal and statutory offences — Intimidating justice system participants — Criminal Code, s. 423.1 — Whether complainants were impeded and whether intent to impede established — Routine disrupted, doors locked, additional staff summoned — Natural and probable consequences of accused’s actions considered with R. v. Armstrong — Element of impeding duties established — Element established

    Show more

    […]   [3] As a result of his conduct, Mr. F.-S. was charged with three counts of unlawfully using violence with the intent of provoking a state of fear in a justice system participant in order to impede her in the performance of her duties, contrary to s. 423.1(1) (3) of the Criminal Code , three counts of criminal harassment,   […]  Ms. Campbell testified that she felt “a bit intimidated” by this. Ms. Shaw also described Mr. F.-S as being “in her face”, which made her feel intimidated and threatened.   […]  

  11. 11.

    R. v. Hannell, 2024 ONCJ 377 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2024-07-22  |  27 pages

    AI-generated

    The Court convicted the Accused of criminal harassment for persistently following a reporter to work locations, posting unauthorized photos and tweets, and disregarding police warnings. The Court found the Accused's actions caused reasonable fear for the reporter’s safety, escalating after explicit non-contact instructions were ignored.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal and statutory offences — Criminal harassment — Elements — Whether the Crown proved repeated following, repeated direct or indirect communications, and besetting of places where the complainant worked — Twitter posts, covert photographs, and on‑site attendances analysed under Criminal Code, s. 264 — Conduct found to harass — Elements established beyond a reasonable doubt — Accused found guilty

    Criminal and statutory offences — Criminal harassment — Fear for safety — Whether the complainant’s fear, including psychological well‑being, was objectively reasonable — Reliance on R. v. Wisniewska and R. v. B.S. — Fear grounded in escalating conduct, disregard of police warning, unpredictable behaviour, and potential retribution — Psychological safety engaged and fear accepted as reasonable — Accused found guilty

    Criminal and statutory offences — Criminal harassment — Mens rea — Did the accused know or was he reckless that his conduct harassed the complainant after the police warning? — Police direction to stop on July 10 ignored — Continued attendance at broadcast and hostile e‑mail to employer considered — Knowledge or recklessness inferred from persistence — Accused found guilty

    Evidence — Credibility — Criminal trials — Application of W.(D.) and Lifchus — Whether the accused’s evidence raised a reasonable doubt — Implausible and internally inconsistent testimony rejected — Complainant credible and reliable regarding fear and impact — Assessment made on totality of evidence, not a credibility contest — Standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt met — Accused found guilty

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    […]   [8] Crown counsel, Ms. McKenzie, provided two cases which she submits are of assistance in understanding the elements of the criminal harassment offence and in applying them in the accused’s case.   […]  Crown counsel provided the case of R. v. D.D. (2005), 2005 CanLII 42472 (ON CA) , 203 C.C.C. (3d) 6 (Ont. C.A.) in which the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the admissibility of an accused’s pre-charge conduct when he is charged with criminal harassment.   […]  

  12. 12.

    R. v. Karimi, 2014 ONCA 320 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2014-04-28  |  11 pages  |  cited by 2 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court upheld convictions for extortion and harassment, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on evidence, threats, and harassment elements. The appellant’s arguments regarding jury instructions, similar fact evidence, and sentencing were dismissed. The sentence of three years was deemed appropriate given the severity of the offences.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing

    Criminal infractions — Extortion — Criminal harassment — Sentencing — Appellant convicted of extortion, criminal harassment, and attempted extortion — Threats to employees to recover money allegedly stolen — Use of alleged association with Iranian Revolutionary Guard to intimidate complainants — Was the sentence fit and appropriate? — Sentencing principles for extortion and harassment offenses — Sentence of three years upheld as fit and proportionate

    Criminal procedure — Jury instructions — Evidence and issues — Trial judge’s failure to relate evidence to essential elements of charges — Did the trial judge err in failing to relate evidence to the elements of extortion and harassment? — Jury charge provided sufficient understanding of elements and defense position — No error found in jury instructions

    Criminal procedure — Similar fact evidence — Collusion — Trial judge directed jury to consider evidence of three complainants as similar fact evidence — Defense argued complainants colluded to fabricate allegations — Did the trial judge err in admitting similar fact evidence? — Evidence admissible to support prosecution theory — Jury sufficiently instructed on proper use of evidence

    Evidence — Extortion — Threats to call police — Contextual analysis — Can a threat to call the police constitute extortion? — Threats to report complainants to police unless money was paid — Context and false accusations considered — Threats found to meet extortion requirements under Criminal Code

    Evidence — Criminal harassment — Jury instructions — Fear for safety — Trial judge’s instructions on repeated communication and fear for safety — Did the trial judge err in instructing the jury on harassment elements? — Full and accurate instructions provided on harassment elements, including fear for safety — No error found in jury instructions

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    […]   (b) justice system participants who are involved in the proceedings are protected. (3) If an accused is charged with an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 163.1, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 212, 271, 272 or 273 and the prosecutor or the accused applies for an order under   […]   requisite threat element of the offence of extortion. (4) The law of harassment [27] The appellant objects that the trial judge told the jury that: “In this case criminal harassment is made out if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was repeated communication that resulted in the person being harassed.” He   […]  

  13. 13.

    R. v. Gauthier, 2024 ONCA 621 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2024-08-20  |  34 pages  |  cited by 6 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court upheld the admissibility of a voicemail, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy due to its harassing nature. However, it ruled the accused’s statements to officers inadmissible due to insufficient evidence of voluntariness but applied the curative proviso, dismissing the appeal.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Evidence — Admissibility of voicemail — Criminal harassment — Appellant left voicemail for doctor containing threatening and harassing content — Whether appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in voicemail — Voicemail admitted as evidence of planning and deliberation in first-degree murder trial — Charter s. 8 not triggered due to lack of reasonable expectation of privacy — Normative considerations of privacy in criminal harassment communications — Criminal Code, ss. 231(2), 231(5)(e), 264, 372(3)

    Constitution — Charter of Rights — Section 8 — Reasonable expectation of privacy — Appellant argued voicemail seizure violated s. 8 Charter rights — Trial judge ruled no reasonable expectation of privacy in voicemail used to commit criminal harassment — Whether voicemail seizure without warrant was lawful — Application of s. 24(2) to exclude evidence — R. v. Lambert and R. v. Marakah applied

    Criminal procedure — Voluntariness of confessions — Appellant’s alleged confessions to police and correctional officers — Statements not audio or video recorded — Late entries in officers’ notes — Gaps in evidentiary record — Trial judge failed to adequately consider deficiencies in Crown’s evidence — Crown did not discharge burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt — R. v. Oickle and R. v. Tessier applied

    Constitution — Criminal Code s. 686(1)(b)(iii) — Curative proviso — Whether errors in admitting appellant’s statements impacted jury’s verdict — Statements provided no evidence of planning or premeditation — Overwhelming evidence of first-degree murder based on voicemail and physical evidence — Curative proviso applied to dismiss appeal

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    […]   the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the justice system participant   […]   recognized that a Charter claimant may have no reasonable expectation of privacy “where electronic messages sent by the Charter claimant to the victim are used as the means of committing the offence charged, such as the offence of threatening to cause death or bodily harm, or criminal harassment”: Lambert , at para. 60 .   […]  

  14. 14.

    R. v. Mikhail, 2023 ONCJ 432 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2023-10-04  |  40 pages  |  cited by 3 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court sentenced the Accused to 15 months' imprisonment and two years' probation for distributing intimate images and voyeurism involving multiple victims. The decision emphasized the need for denunciation and deterrence, rejecting less restrictive sentences due to the significant harm caused and the offender's high moral blameworthiness.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal infractions — Sentencing — Distribution of intimate images without consent — Surreptitious visual recordings for sexual purposes — Multiple victims — Aggravating factors include premeditation, breach of trust, and significant harm to victims — Mitigating factors include guilty plea, lack of prior record, and rehabilitation efforts — Does the principle of totality apply to sentencing for multiple offences? — Proportionality and denunciation emphasized — Criminal Code, ss. 162(5), 162.1(1), 718, 718.1, 718.2

    Criminal procedure — Sentencing conditions — DNA order and probation — Imposition of probation conditions prohibiting contact with victims, access to specific websites, and attendance at certain locations — Requirement to destroy intimate images and participate in rehabilitative programs — Are such conditions necessary to protect the public and rehabilitate the offender? — Criminal Code, ss. 487.051, 743.21

    Criminal procedure — Victim impact statements and pre-sentence reports — Role in sentencing — Victim impact statements detailing psychological harm and loss of trust — Pre-sentence report providing offender’s background and rehabilitation efforts — Should victim input in pre-sentence reports be disregarded? — Proper use of victim impact statements under Criminal Code, ss. 722, 721(3)(a)

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    […]   (2) JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS — On application of the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information   […]  one count of mischief and one count of criminal harassment. The sentencing judge granted the offender two months’ credit for his time served and sentenced him to a suspended sentence and two years’ probation on the mischief charge, and to 90 days’ imprisonment, to be served intermittently on the criminal harassment charge.   […]  

  15. 15.

    R. v. Crossley, 2023 ONSC 7018 (CanLII)

    Ontario Superior Court of Justice

    2023-12-14  |  12 pages  |  cited by 3 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court sentenced the Accused to two years' incarceration and three years' probation for threats, intimidation, and harassment targeting justice system participants and religious property. The sentence emphasized denunciation and deterrence, citing risks of reoffending and moral justification rooted in delusional beliefs. Mental health considerations did not reduce culpability.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing

    Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing — Denunciation and deterrence — Fit sentence for intimidation of a justice system participant, criminal harassment, and threats under ss. 718 and 718.02 — Offences strike at the heart of the justice system — Protection of justice participants under s. 423.1 emphasised — Denunciatory sentence required — Two years’ custody and three-year probation ordered

    Criminal and statutory offences — Mitigating factors — Mental health — Should mental health mitigate sentence without formal diagnosis or nexus to conduct? — Prioriello test applied for mitigation — No evidence of causal link to offences — Limited consideration of possible illness, no compassionate reduction — Mitigation limited

    Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing — Pre-sentence custody and concurrency — Credit for 60 days pre-sentence custody at 1.5:1 reducing sentence by 90 days — Distribution by count with all terms concurrent — Global sentence reduced to two years — Credit applied and sentences concurrent

    Criminal and statutory offences — Ancillary orders — Prohibitions and conditions — Should ancillary orders issue on sentencing? — Weapons prohibition under s. 109 imposed — DNA order granted — Non-communication order under s. 743.21 and tailored probation conditions including non-attendance — Ancillary orders granted

    Show more

    […]   [1] The Accused, Lance Crossley was found guilty after a jury trial of one incident of threatening to cause bodily harm, one incident of threatening to cause damage to property, two incidents of intimidation of a justice system participant, and two incidents of criminal harassment.   […]  She indicated that Mr. Crossley asked to have that information included in the report and he also asserted to her that he was making a threat. Intimidation of justice system participants (counts 3 &6) [10] Lance Crossley sent an email and letter to a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice.   […]  

  16. 16.

    R. v. E.D., 2018 ONCJ 714 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2018-09-17  |  8 pages  |  cited by 1 document

    AI-generated

    The Court admitted an audio-recorded statement from the complainant as hearsay evidence, finding it necessary and sufficiently reliable to prove the truth of its content, despite the complainant's recantation and memory issues. The probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, ensuring trial fairness.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions Evidence

    Evidence — Hearsay — Principled exception — Necessity and reliability — Complainant’s prior statement to police — Complainant recanted or lacked memory of events — Crown sought to admit prior statement for truth of its content — Should the complainant’s prior statement be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule? — Test for necessity and reliability from R. v. Khan and R. v. Khelawon applied

    Evidence — Reliability of prior statements — Complainant’s recantation or memory issues — Statement audio-recorded — Complainant cautioned about truthfulness and legal consequences — Consistency with other statements — Should the complainant’s recantation or lack of memory affect the reliability of her prior statement? — Reliability assessed based on circumstances of the statement and corroborative factors

    Evidence — Prejudicial effect versus probative value — Judge-alone trial — Moral and reasoning prejudice — Probative value of complainant’s prior statement significant — Should the trial judge exclude the complainant’s prior statement if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value? — Balancing test applied; probative value found to outweigh prejudice

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    […]   (2) JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS — On application of the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information   […]  10. Criminally harassing JP in June and July, 2017. [2] Crown counsel elected to proceed by indictment.   […]  

  17. 17.

    R. v. B.F., 2024 ONCA 511 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2024-06-27  |  28 pages  |  cited by 3 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court upheld the conviction and life sentence for attempted murder of a child but ordered a new trial for the attempted murder of the appellant’s mother. The jury instructions failed to adequately distinguish between attempted murder and aiding suicide, creating a potential misapplication of the law.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal procedure — Jury instructions — Party liability — Attempted murder — Aiding suicide — Trial judge instructed jury that providing insulin pens could constitute administering a noxious substance — Did the trial judge err in distinguishing aiding suicide under s. 241(1)(b) from attempted murder? — Proper mens rea for attempted murder clarified — Criminal Code, ss. 21, 24, 241

    Criminal procedure — Verdict consistency — Attempted murder and aggravated assault — Appellant acquitted of aggravated assault but convicted of attempted murder — Was the acquittal inconsistent with the conviction? — Court held verdicts not inconsistent but highlighted jury instruction issues

    Criminal procedure — Defences — Suicide pact — Appellant argued for jury instruction on "suicide pact" defence under Gagnon — Trial judge rejected defence as inapplicable — Did the trial judge err in failing to instruct the jury on this defence? — Court clarified narrow applicability of Gagnon

    Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Life imprisonment — Attempted murder of child — Appellant sentenced to life imprisonment with 10 years parole ineligibility — Was the sentence harsh or excessive? — Court upheld sentence as fit given premeditation, breach of trust, and severe harm to victim

    Criminal procedure — Pre-sentence custody — Duncan credit — Appellant argued for enhanced credit due to harsh jail conditions — Did the sentencing judge err in declining Duncan credit? — Court found no evidence of identifiable harm and upheld sentencing judge’s discretion

    Show more

    […]   the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the justice system participant   […]  He was also charged with criminal harassment and uttering death threats. A.N. ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal harassment and uttering threats and was sentenced to 27 days in jail (to be served intermittently), followed by probation.   […]  

  18. 18.

    R. v. Sadek, 2023 ONCA 841 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2023-12-18  |  12 pages

    AI-generated

    The Court upheld convictions despite police Charter breaches during apartment and vehicle searches, ruling vehicle evidence admissible under the Grant framework while excluding items from the apartment.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Evidence — Charter remedies — Exclusion of evidence — s. 24(2) balancing under R. v. Grant — Should evidence from vehicle searches be excluded given serious apartment-related s. 8 breaches and technical vehicle breaches? — Contextual and temporal connection considered, reliability of real evidence weighed — Intrusion into home did not carry over to vehicles — Admission would not bring administration of justice into disrepute — Appeal dismissed

    Rights and freedoms — Search and seizure — Warrantless seizure of vehicle — Criminal Code, s. 489(2) — Did removal and towing of the Chrysler before a warrant infringe s. 8? — Court assumes s. 8 breach for analysis — Minimal impact on privacy interests where vehicles not searched until warrants issued — Connection to apartment breach remote regarding vehicles — s. 8 breach assumed

    Rights and freedoms — Search and seizure — Reporting to a justice — Criminal Code, s. 489.1(1) — Did delay in making a report to a justice infringe s. 8 and what was the impact? — Delay conceded to infringe s. 8 — Technical breach with negligible impact on privacy — No effect on grounds for search warrants — s. 8 breach found

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    […]   the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the justice system participant   […]  [1] The appellant appeals from his convictions for criminal harassment, uttering a threat to cause death, four counts of impersonating a peace officer, and four firearm/weapons offences.   […]  

  19. 19.

    R. v. Nassr, 2025 ONSC 4765 (CanLII)

    Ontario Superior Court of Justice

    2025-08-13  |  16 pages

    AI-generated

    The Court acquitted the Accused of intimidating a prosecutor, finding insufficient evidence to prove intent to instill fear or impede duties.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Young offenders

    Criminal infractions — Intimidation of justice system participant — Mens rea — Accused charged under s. 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for referencing prosecutor’s child during cross-examination — Did the accused intend to instill fear or impede the prosecutor’s duties? — Crown required to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt — Common sense inference and circumstantial evidence applied — Accused found not guilty due to reasonable doubt about intent

    Evidence — Mens rea — Circumstantial evidence — Accused’s interrupted statement referencing prosecutor’s child — Whether incomplete statement and mental health issues created reasonable doubt about intent — Common sense inference applied to determine subjective intent — Crown failed to prove intent to instill fear beyond a reasonable doubt

    Criminal procedure — Actus reus — Conduct directed at justice system participant — Accused’s comment referencing prosecutor’s child during trial — Whether conduct met actus reus requirements under s. 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code — Evidence established conduct was directed at prosecutor without lawful authority — Actus reus requirements satisfied

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    […]   Mr. S testified that after court that day, he engaged the protocol that governs when justice system participants are subject to a threat. When he went home, he told his wife about what happened.   […]  Those amendments broadened the scope of the potential conduct that could occasion an offence, eliminating the requirement that the accused have used violence against a justice system participant, or anyone known to them, caused damage to their property, or threatened to engage in such conduct: see Victims Bill of Rights,   […]  

  20. 20.

    R. v. Dhami, 2019 ONCJ 10 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2019-01-08  |  15 pages  |  cited by 6 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court granted a publication ban to protect a vulnerable victim's identity, finding it necessary to prevent harm and uphold justice, while balancing privacy rights against freedom of expression and press transparency.

    Access to information and privacy Criminal or statutory infractions

    Criminal procedure — Publication bans — Victim identity — Application under section 486.5 of the Criminal Code — Crown sought a publication ban to protect the identity of a vulnerable victim with Asperger Syndrome — Defence did not oppose the application — Should the publication ban be granted? — Balancing privacy, freedom of expression, and the proper administration of justice — Section 486.5(7) factors applied — Publication ban granted to prevent further harm to the victim

    Statutory interpretation — Criminal Code — Section 486.5 — Proper administration of justice — Test for granting publication bans — Whether the statutory test under section 486.5 differs from the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test — Statutory factors under section 486.5(7) considered collectively — Real and substantial risk of harm not required under amended provision — Statutory test governs over common law

    Rights and freedoms — Freedom of expression — Open court principle — Balancing freedom of the press with privacy rights of vulnerable victims — Whether a publication ban infringes on freedom of expression — Limited scope of ban restricted to victim identity — Transparency of court proceedings otherwise maintained — Ban justified to protect victim’s dignity and privacy

    Evidence — Victim impact — Real and substantial risk of harm — Victim’s step-mother testified about emotional toll and privacy concerns — Victim’s fear of workplace discrimination and media intrusion — Evidence of harm credible and accepted — Does the evidence establish a real and substantial risk of harm? — Risk of harm found to be genuine and significant

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    […]   (2) JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS — On application of the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information   […]  [23] In R. v. Cook, 2013 ONSC 7291 (CanLII) , [2013] O.J. No. 5414 (S.C.) , s. 486.5 was relied upon to ban the publication of the complainant’s name in a case in which the defendant was charged with criminal harassment and extortion arising from his threat to expose their relationship to their mutual employer after the   […]  

  21. 21.

    R. v. Levely, 2022 ONCA 632 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2022-09-06  |  21 pages

    AI-generated

    The Court rejected the appellant’s claims of trial errors, including the mishandling of email evidence and misapprehension of testimony. Convictions for harassment, assault, sexual assault, and other offences were upheld, as the trial judge’s findings were well-supported and the alleged errors did not undermine fairness or reliability.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Interpretation

    Criminal and statutory offences — Criminal harassment — Sexual assault and related counts — Whether criminal harassment proven independently of challenged findings — Threatening emails and reasonable fear established — Assault, mischief, extortion, sexual assault, forcible confinement and breach of probation supported by credibility findings — June 26 email analysis did not taint verdicts — Sentence appeal not pursued — Appeal dismissed

    Evidence — Misapprehension of evidence — Exhibits and aids — Did the trial judge err by ignoring a 1:12 p.m. email in a PowerPoint? — PowerPoint filed as an aid, not evidence — Only numbered exhibits constituted the record — No misapprehension of material evidence under R. v. Lohrer — Reliance on 1:11 p.m. email permissible — Convictions upheld

    Procedure — Trial fairness — Alternative theory — Did reliance on the 1:11 p.m. email deny full answer and defence? — Appellant was cross‑examined on the 1:11 p.m. email — Crown’s closing relied on its significance — No new theory inconsistent with how case was conducted, see R. v. R.H., R. v. Largie — Trial unfairness claim rejected

    Evidence — Credibility — Defence witness — Did the trial judge misapprehend the defence witness’s evidence about the house? — Reasons reconciled witness evidence with complainant’s account — Complainant assumed seeing the homeowner, presence on date uncertain — Non‑residence evidence did not undermine core account — Reasons responsive to defence contention — Ground of appeal rejected

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    […]   [2] The criminal harassment charge arose out of numerous threatening emails the appellant sent, on June 24 and 25, 2019, to the complainant, his former intimate partner, demanding that she see him and return money he claimed she owed him.   […]  [47] The trial judge’s factual findings clearly support the criminal harassment conviction. The trial judge made her findings based on the contents of the appellant’s June 24 and 25 emails, which were clearly persistent and threatening, and the complainant’s evidence of the fear they reasonably induced in her.   […]  

  22. 22.

    R. v. Huth, 2019 ONCJ 138 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2019-02-11  |  12 pages  |  cited by 3 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court sentenced the Accused to 10 months' incarceration and 18 months' probation for criminal harassment and obstruction of justice, emphasizing deterrence, denunciation, and the protection of victims, while considering mitigating factors such as a guilty plea and employment prospects.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing

    Criminal infractions — Sentencing — Criminal harassment — Obstruction of justice — Accused pled guilty to criminal harassment and obstruction of justice — Aggravating factors included prior criminal record, repeated breaches of court orders, and emotional harm to the victim and her children — Mitigating factors included guilty plea, remorse, and family support — Appropriate sentence determined to be 10 months’ incarceration, less pre-trial custody credit — Principles of denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality applied — Criminal Code, ss. 264(2)(b), 139(2), 718, 718.2

    Criminal infractions — Probation conditions — No-contact orders — Counselling — Weapons prohibition — Accused sentenced to 18 months’ probation following custodial sentence — Conditions included no contact with the victim or her children, mandatory counselling, and lifetime weapons prohibition — Conditions aimed at rehabilitation and protection of the victim — Criminal Code, ss. 109(1)(a), 742.2(1)

    Criminal procedure — DNA orders — Secondary designated offences — Crown requested DNA order for the accused — Court granted the order despite no prior confirmation of DNA submission — DNA order deemed appropriate for secondary designated offences — Criminal Code, s. 487.04

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    […]   On August 18, 2018, Mr. Huth was arrested and charged with criminal harassment and breach of probation. On March 8th, 2016, Mr. Huth was placed on a three-year period of probation by Mr. Justice Harpur for criminally harassing his former spouse, Susan Ramos, and breaching his probation.   […]  Dealing with the offence of criminal harassment: Stand up, sir. I am not discounting the emotional impact that the constant harassment has had on her and her family, but it was over a three-day period in August.   […]  

  23. 23.

    R. v. A.C., 2017 ONCJ 317 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2017-05-16  |  28 pages  |  cited by 42 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court sentenced the offender to five months' imprisonment and probation for sharing intimate images without consent, emphasizing deterrence, denunciation, and the severe harm caused to the victim. A conditional sentence was deemed insufficient given the offender's deliberate and egregious actions.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing

    Criminal infractions — Sentencing — Sharing intimate images without consent — Offender uploaded private videos and photos of the victim online, including identifying information, without consent — What is the appropriate sentence for the offence under section 162.1 of the Criminal Code? — Sentence must reflect proportionality, deterrence, and denunciation — Five-month custodial sentence imposed, followed by probation

    Criminal procedure — Conditional sentence vs custodial sentence — Offender sought a conditional discharge with probation, while the Crown sought a custodial sentence — Should a conditional sentence be imposed for sharing intimate images without consent? — Conditional sentence rejected due to the severity of the offence and need for denunciation — Custodial sentence deemed necessary

    Rights and freedoms — Internet prohibition orders — Sentencing considerations — Should an internet prohibition order be imposed on the offender? — Internet prohibition rejected as overly punitive and potentially hindering rehabilitation — Court emphasized the necessity of proportionality in sentencing conditions

    Evidence — Aggravating and mitigating factors — Sentencing for sharing intimate images without consent — Aggravating factors included breach of trust, victim’s identifiable information, and intent to humiliate — Mitigating factors included guilty plea and lack of prior criminal record — Aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, justifying custodial sentence

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    […]   (2) JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS — On application of the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information   […]  Currently, the Criminal Code can in fact address most of the serious forms of cyberbullying through, for example, existing offences of criminal harassment per section 264, uttering threats per section 264.1 or identity fraud, found in section 403.   […]  

  24. 24.

    R. v. Crowe, 2023 ONCJ 278 (CanLII)

    Ontario Court of Justice

    2023-06-28  |  21 pages  |  cited by 1 document

    AI-generated

    The Court sentenced the Accused to a conditional sentence and probation for prolonged criminal harassment of a former partner, emphasizing deterrence, denunciation, and the protection of vulnerable victims, while considering his rehabilitation efforts and time served in pre-trial custody.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing

    Criminal infractions — Sentencing — Criminal harassment — Harassing communications — Breach of probation and release orders — Impersonation — Offender engaged in coercive control and harassment of former intimate partner over 14 months — Aggravating factors included deliberate, planned conduct and harm to victim’s autonomy and reputation — Mitigating factors included rehabilitation efforts and addiction history — Appropriate sentence balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation — Criminal Code, ss. 718, 718.1, 718.2(a)(ii), 718.201

    Criminal procedure — Pre-sentence custody — Restrictive bail conditions — Harsh detention conditions — Offender detained for 285 days in pre-trial custody under difficult conditions, including COVID-19 lockdowns and inmate assaults — House arrest and curfew conditions post-release — Credit awarded for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions — Judicial discretion in applying credit — Criminal Code, s. 719; R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26

    Criminal infractions — Conditional sentence — Rehabilitation — Offender demonstrated significant rehabilitation efforts, including sobriety, employment, and community reintegration — Conditional sentence imposed instead of further incarceration — Balancing public interest in deterrence and denunciation with offender’s rehabilitation — Criminal Code, ss. 742.1, 742.3; R. v. Sauvé, 2023 ONCA 310

    Criminal infractions — Ancillary orders — DNA order — Weapons prohibition — Victim fine surcharges — DNA order imposed for secondary designated offence of criminal harassment — Mandatory weapons prohibition imposed — Victim fine surcharges ordered with time to pay — Criminal Code, ss. 109, 487.051(3)(b)

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    […]   (2) JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS — On application of the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information   […]  Justice Ramsay described the relationship between the complainant and the accused as a “clear cycle of abuse.” The accused “conducted a relentless campaign of threats... and sent hundreds of emails which were not only threatening conduct but that were extremely sexually graphic and demeaning.” The criminal harassment was so   […]  

  25. 25.

    R. v. Lowe, 2018 ONCA 777 (CanLII)

    Court of Appeal for Ontario

    2018-09-24  |  4 pages  |  cited by 9 documents

    AI-generated

    The Court dismissed the appellant's challenge to a nine-year sentence for violent domestic offences, including sexual assault. It found the trial judge properly applied sentencing principles, emphasizing deterrence, denunciation, and the severity of the appellant's conduct. The sentence was deemed fit and owed deference.

    Criminal or statutory infractions Interpretation

    Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Fitness of sentence — Appellant convicted of multiple offences, including sexual assault, and sentenced to a global term of nine years less credit for time served — Appellant argued that the seven-year sentence for sexual assault was demonstrably unfit — Did the trial judge err in imposing a sentence outside the suggested range? — Sentencing ranges are guidelines, not strict limits, and appellate intervention is unwarranted absent significant error or unreasonableness

    Criminal procedure — Sentencing principles — Totality and proportionality — Trial judge considered principles of totality and proportionality in crafting a global sentence — Appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly account for the significant increase in sentence length — Did the trial judge err in applying these principles? — Sentencing decisions are owed deference unless they reflect an error in principle or result in an unfit sentence

    Evidence — Sentencing — Aggravating and mitigating factors — Trial judge considered aggravating factors, including appellant’s lengthy criminal record and the violent, degrading nature of the offences, and mitigating factors, including lack of prior lengthy incarceration — Should the appellate court defer to the trial judge’s findings on these factors? — Deference is owed to trial judges’ findings unless they are clearly unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence

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    […]   [2] The trial judge noted, at paras. 1 and 2, that the jury found the appellant guilty of 12 charges: sexual assault; assault with a weapon; simple assault (two counts); threatening to cause death (four counts); mischief (three counts); and criminal harassment.   […]  The appellant received a seven year sentence for the sexual assault conviction, six months consecutive on one of the assault convictions, 12 months consecutive on the criminal harassment conviction, and six months consecutive on the breach of recognizance conviction.   […]  

 
 
 

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