Dead Time, Time Served, &“Banked” Custody Credits in Canada
- Stephen Morris
- May 22
- 25 min read
A practical public guide for lawyers, self-represented litigants, and sentencing courts
Canadian criminal courts speak constantly about “time served,” “dead time,” “enhanced credit,” and “pre-sentence custody.” Yet many accused persons — and sometimes even counsel — misunderstand what those phrases actually mean, when they apply, and when they absolutely do not.
The distinction matters. A misunderstanding about remand credit can dramatically alter plea negotiations, sentencing submissions, bail strategy, or even whether an accused accepts a resolution at all.
This memo-style overview explains the modern Canadian law surrounding pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code, with particular focus on the increasingly litigated issue of whether “dead time” from one matter can be transferred or “banked” against another.
1. What Is “Dead Time”?
In Canadian sentencing practice, “dead time” generally refers to time spent in custody before sentencing — usually in remand detention — that does not carry the ordinary institutional benefits available to sentenced prisoners.
Historically, remand detainees often lacked:
parole eligibility,
remission credits,
institutional programming,
rehabilitative services,
meaningful work opportunities,
stable classification placements.
Because remand custody was considered harsher and less useful than sentenced custody, courts developed the practice of granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence detention, often at a rate greater than 1:1.
The Supreme Court of Canada later recognized this rationale in cases interpreting s. 719 of the Criminal Code, although Parliament subsequently limited enhanced credit through the Truth in Sentencing reforms.
Today, the governing provisions remain:
Credit for pre-sentence custody governed by s.719(3) \text and s.719(3.1) Criminal Code
Under the modern framework:
the normal maximum credit is generally 1:1, and
enhanced credit up to 1.5:1 may still be available where circumstances justify it and statutory restrictions do not apply.
2. “Time Served” Is Not Always the Same Thing as “Dead Time”
This is where confusion often begins.
Many accused persons hear a sentence described as “time served” and assume all jail time automatically counts toward all future matters. That is incorrect.
A sentence of “time served” usually means:
the court has determined the accused already accumulated enough pre-sentence custody connected to that offence to satisfy the custodial portion of the sentence.
The key phrase is:
“as a result of the offence.”
That wording comes directly from s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code and has become the central limiting principle in modern appellate jurisprudence.
Courts increasingly reject attempts to:
“bank” remand credit,
transfer unused custody credit between unrelated matters,
double-count detention across separate prosecutions,
or effectively create retroactive concurrency between unrelated offences.
3. The Modern Rule: No Double Counting for Unrelated Offences
Canadian appellate courts are now remarkably consistent on this point:
Pre-sentence custody credit generally cannot be applied to unrelated charges or unrelated sentences.
Several recent authorities state this bluntly.
In R. v. Roulette, the Manitoba Court of Appeal held:
“It was an error in principle to grant any credit for pre-sentence custody in relation to other charges unrelated to the charges upon which he was sentenced.”
Similarly, R. v. Henderson concluded that granting remand credit while an accused was simultaneously serving another unrelated sentence would effectively amount to:
concurrent sentencing for an entirely unrelated crime.
Ontario appellate jurisprudence has adopted much the same approach.
In R. v. Latif, the Court of Appeal emphasized that permitting unrelated custodial time to reduce another sentence would “distort the sentencing regime.”
Likewise, R. v. Perkins rejected the notion that custody credits on unrelated charges could simply be “banked” for future use.
These cases collectively establish the current dominant rule:
custody credit must maintain a meaningful causal relationship to the offence being sentenced.
4. Why Courts Reject “Banked” Custody
The judicial concern is fundamentally about proportionality and fairness.
If unrelated remand time could automatically transfer between files, courts worry that:
offenders could receive duplicate credit,
sentencing parity would collapse,
unrelated offences would effectively become concurrent by default,
and serious offences could receive artificial sentence reductions disconnected from culpability.
Courts repeatedly describe this as a “double-counting” problem.
For example, R. v. Bacon warned that allowing duplicate credit undermines confidence in sentencing and diminishes public respect for the justice system.
Similarly, R. v. Keepness held that where custody arises from unrelated matters, the factual basis for remand credit simply does not exist.
5. But the Law Is Not Entirely Absolute
Despite the modern trend, there are important nuances.
The leading example is R. v. Barnett.
There, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that custody may sometimes relate meaningfully to multiple sets of charges simultaneously.
The court emphasized that the phrase:
“as a result of the offence”
should not be interpreted with excessive rigidity.
Where overlapping charges, bail revocations, or intertwined detention circumstances exist, a court may still find sufficient causal connection between the custody and more than one matter.
This becomes especially important where:
one set of charges caused bail revocation on another,
detention flowed from interconnected conduct,
or the accused would likely have remained detained on both matters regardless.
In other words:
courts prohibit artificial banking, but they may still recognize genuine overlapping causation.
That distinction is critical.
6. Practical Sentencing Strategy for Lawyers and SLRs
For defence counsel and self-represented litigants (“SLRs”), the practical lesson is straightforward:
A. Track Custody Chronology Meticulously
Every sentencing submission involving remand credit should clearly identify:
arrest dates,
warrant dates,
bail revocations,
unrelated custodial sentences,
periods of exclusive remand,
periods of overlapping detention,
and the exact causal basis for custody.
The difference between:
“in custody generally”
and
“in custody as a result of this offence”
is often outcome-determinative.
B. Do Not Assume “Time Served” Carries Forward
A common mistake occurs when accused persons believe unused custody on one file can later reduce another sentence automatically.
Modern appellate authority strongly rejects this assumption.
Cases like:
R. v. Latif,
R. v. Perkins,
R. v. Roulette,
and R. v. Goodkey
all reinforce that principle.
C. Focus on Causal Connection
The strongest remand-credit arguments now revolve around causation.
Counsel should ask:
Did these charges contribute to detention?
Would the accused have been released but for this matter?
Did this prosecution trigger bail revocation?
Were the matters procedurally intertwined?
Did the Crown rely on one file to oppose release in another?
Those are stronger arguments than abstract fairness submissions.
D. Use Harsh Conditions Evidence Strategically
Even where unrelated custody cannot technically be credited, harsh remand conditions may still remain relevant to overall sentence fitness.
Courts continue to recognize that:
overcrowding,
lockdowns,
segregation,
lack of programming,
and extreme remand conditions
can justify mitigation.
Cases such as R. v. J.L.G. and R. v. Rigby discuss enhanced credit arising from particularly difficult custodial conditions.
This became especially significant during the COVID-19 era, as discussed in R. v. Bedard-Morin.
7. Important Cases to Know
Below is a concise practical list.
Core “No Banking” Authorities
R. v. LatifStrong Ontario authority against transferring unrelated custody credit.
R. v. PerkinsRejects “banking” remand credit on unrelated stayed charges.
R. v. RouletteCalling unrelated credit an “error in principle.”
R. v. KeepnessNo factual basis for credit where custody arose from unrelated matters.
R. v. GoodkeyBail custody on unrelated charges not “dead time” for earlier sentence.
Important Nuance / Exception Cases
R. v. BarnettFlexible interpretation of “as a result of the offence”; overlapping causation matters.
R. v. RuelasAdditional credit allowed where factual overlap supported it.
Cases on Harsh Remand Conditions
R. v. J.L.G.Enhanced credit for especially poor remand conditions.
R. v. SabourinImportant appellate discussion of why remand historically attracted enhanced credit.
8. Final Observations
The modern Canadian law of pre-sentence custody has evolved away from broad discretionary fairness and toward a far more structured causation analysis.
Today’s courts generally ask:
Was this custody truly attributable to this offence?
If the answer is no, courts are increasingly unwilling to allow transfer, banking, or duplication of remand credit.
Yet important flexibility remains where detention realities overlap in a meaningful way.
For defence lawyers and SLRs alike, the practical lesson is simple:
build a precise custody timeline,
prove causal linkage carefully,
avoid unsupported “banked credit” arguments,
and distinguish unrelated detention from intertwined detention.
Because in sentencing law, a single phrase often controls the entire outcome:
Pre-sentence custody credit applies only where detention occurred as a result of the offence.
SOURCES
1.
R. v. Goodkey, 2015 BCSC 1977 (CanLII)
Supreme Court of British Columbia
2015-10-30 | 5 pages | cited by 1 document
AI-generated
Contracts Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations
[…] It is a trite statement of the law that time served by an offender on bail on unrelated charges is not “dead time” on an earlier sentence. […] The sentencing court refused to give credit for “dead time” on the unrelated charges after reviewing s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code . […]
2.
R v Roulette, 2024 MBCA 28 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal of Manitoba
2024-03-21 | 3 pages | cited by 2 documents
AI-generated
Appeal Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations
[…] In fact, there was an agreement that the accused was not entitled to any credit for pre-sentence custody. The accused himself gave the exact date his unrelated jail sentence would end. […] [16] It was an error in principle to grant any credit for pre-sentence custody in relation to other charges unrelated to the charges upon which he was sentenced. […]
3.
R. v Henderson, 2022 NBPC 5 (CanLII)
Provincial Court of New Brunswick
2022-09-21 | 14 pages | cited by 4 documents
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Assault — Aggravated assault — Sentencing — Considerations
[…] 49. The conclusion of this Court, having considered this authority, is that an accused cannot expect to benefit by way of a remand credit for pre-trial or pre-sentence custody if they are serving out a sentence on an unrelated matter. […] To allow Mr. Henderson a remand credit in these circumstances would be akin to sentencing him to concurrent time for an entirely unrelated crime. […]
4.
R. v. Pete, 2019 BCCA 244 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for British Columbia
2019-07-05 | 38 pages | cited by 67 documents
AI-generated
Contracts Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Sexual offences — Sexual assault — Sentencing — Considerations
[…] Credit for pre-sentence custody varied in accordance with s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code so that the appellant received credit for pre-sentence custody “as a result of the offence”, but not where it was unrelated to the offence. […] principled reasons for granting enhanced credit under s. 719(3). The judge did, however, err by granting the accused credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody during Period 1 on an unrelated offence, and by denying the appellant enhanced credit at a rate of 1.5:1 for his time in pre-sentence custody during Period 2. […]
5.
R. v. Bedard-Morin, 2022 ONCA 844 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for Ontario
2022-12-05 | 6 pages | cited by 3 documents
AI-generated
The Court dismissed an appeal challenging a 22-month sentence, ruling that pre-sentence custody credit cannot be double-counted for unrelated offences. The sentencing judge appropriately considered mitigating factors, including COVID-19 conditions, and imposed a fit sentence based on the appellant's circumstances and the offence's aggravating factors.
Criminal or statutory infractions Interpretation
Criminal procedure — Sentencing appeals — Pre-sentence custody credit — Appellant sought to apply pre-sentence custody credit from an unrelated Quebec offence to the Ontario offence — Whether pre-sentence custody credit for a different offence can be applied to the current sentence — Double-counting of pre-sentence custody credit prohibited under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code — R. v. Latif applied
Evidence — Sentencing — Pre-sentence custody — Appellant argued that pre-sentence custody credit for the Quebec offence should apply to the Ontario offence — Defence counsel at trial acknowledged no basis for double-counting custody credit — Whether trial judge erred in attributing custody credit — Pre-sentence custody must relate to the same offence under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code
Statutory interpretation — Sentencing ranges — Appellant argued that the 22-month sentence was excessive and outside the appropriate range — Trial judge considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including lack of violence and guilty plea — Whether the sentence was demonstrably unfit — High degree of deference owed to sentencing judge’s decision — R. v. Friesen and R. v. Lacasse applied
Criminal procedure — COVID-19 and sentencing — Appellant argued that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody during the COVID-19 pandemic — Trial judge mitigated sentence by considering pandemic-related stress and risk of transmission — Whether the trial judge erred in assessing the impact of COVID-19 on pre-sentence custody — No error found in the trial judge’s approach
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[…] After the appellant’s guilty plea, but before sentencing, it was discovered that the appellant had used up his pre-sentence custody credit for an unrelated matter in Quebec. As a result, the Crown’s position changed from seeking time served to a sentence of two years’ further custody. […] However, the court went on to explain that giving credit for time spent serving a sentence for another offence would distort the sentencing regime: at para. 19. […]
6.
R. v. Watson, 2023 NBPC 11 (CanLII)
Provincial Court of New Brunswick
2023-02-16 | 24 pages | cited by 3 documents
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Sentence hearing — S. 718 application
[…] 49. The conclusion of this Court, having considered this authority, is that an accused cannot expect to benefit by way of a remand credit for pre-trial or pre-sentence custody if they are serving out a sentence on an unrelated matter. […] To allow Mr. Henderson a remand credit in these circumstances would be akin to sentencing him to concurrent time for an entirely unrelated crime. […]
7.
R v Sabourin, 2009 NWTCA 6 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for the Northwest Territories
2009-07-03 | 13 pages | cited by 12 documents
AI-generated
Contracts Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Sentencing — Pre-sentence custody
[…] R.S.C. 1985, c. P-20 , for time served on the sentence, (b) the fact that remand custody circumstances are frequently ‘dead time’ in the sense that there may be few or no helpful programs or treatment made available to the prisoner during the remand time, and (c) the circumstances in remand centres may well be more […] a credit and that there is also an anomaly in doing so. It is not facially obvious why time which would otherwise be remitted or would otherwise be governed by parole or temporary absence for an unrelated sentence should be deductible from time spent in remand, much less why effective double credit should be given for it. […]
8.
R. v. Barnett, 2017 ONCA 897 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for Ontario
2017-11-23 | 17 pages | cited by 49 documents
AI-generated
The Court upheld credit for pre-sentence custody applied to earlier offences, clarifying the "as a result of" requirement under s. 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code. A meaningful causal link to both sets of charges suffices, and rigid application could undermine sentencing fairness.
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Pre-trial custody — Offender denied bail for subsequent offences, including procuring sexual services, while still out on bail for earlier robbery-related charges — Trial judge credited pre-trial custody for both earlier and later offences — Sole issue whether time served was connected to earlier offences — Whether pre-sentence custody was properly applied under Criminal Code Section 719(3), (3.1) — Rationale guided by interplay of various sets of charges and fairness in sentencing frameworks
Statutory interpretation — Criminal Code — Section 719(3) and (3.1) — Meaning of "as a result of" pre-trial custody — Examining whether pre-sentence detention can relate to earlier offences when subsequent offences caused denial of bail — Lower court interpreted flexibility in linking detention circumstances to both sets of offences — Certification of causative connection suffices — Proper interpretation ensures fairness without undue constraints on liberty
Evidence — Relevance in sentencing — Section 726.1 of the Criminal Code — Role of pre-trial custody — Whether the totality of circumstances justifies using pre-sentence custody to reduce sentences — Trial judge used both statutory authority and judicial precedents to evaluate impact of detention and appropriateness of flexibility under overlapping legal provisions — Determining sufficiency of links between custody and charges faced by the offender
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[…] [2] The Crown seeks leave to appeal sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in crediting the appellant with pre-sentence custody incurred following his detention for a later, unrelated offence. […] This court was not dealing with pre-sentence custody, but rather with time served following a totally unrelated conviction. […]
9.
R v Eagle, 2002 NWTSC 39 (CanLII)
Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories
2002-05-13 | 4 pages
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Sentencing — Assault with a weapon — Firearm prohibition
[…] It does not come at an early date and the victim of the assault did have to testify at the preliminary hearing however it does save him from having to testify again at a trial and so I do give full credit to the guilty plea. We are not on the eve of trial here so it does bear a good deal of weight. […] As far as the remand time goes, I have to say that I have a great deal of trouble with crediting time served on another offence, even if it was in remand, to this offence. […]
10.
R. v. Hanna, 2024 ONCA 911 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for Ontario
2024-12-18 | 3 pages | cited by 3 documents
AI-generated
The appeal of a four-year robbery sentence was dismissed. The Court found no errors in the sentencing judge’s emphasis on deterrence, denunciation, and appropriate application of the "jump" principle over low rehabilitative potential.
Appeal Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing — Jump principle — Did the sentencing judge respect the jump principle given prior robbery sentences? — Multiple robberies on different occasions distinguished from earlier sentences — Prior record and offending on release emphasised — Vulnerable victims and escalation addressed — No reversible error identified — Sentence entirely fit — Appeal dismissed
Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing — Rehabilitation versus denunciation and deterrence — Whether denunciation and deterrence were properly paramount for robbery — Was rehabilitation improperly relegated to a secondary role? — Limited programming and no serious addiction treatment noted — Guilty plea and remorse acknowledged — Low rehabilitative potential reasonably found — Sentence entirely fit — Appeal dismissed
Procedure — Appeals — Sentence appeals — Threshold for appellate intervention on sentence under R. v. Lacasse — Error in law or principle impacting sentence or demonstrably unfit required — Deference to trial judge reaffirmed — Contextual, fact specific sentencing analysis applied — No reversible error and sentence not demonstrably unfit — Leave to appeal sentence granted, appeal dismissed
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[…] [1] The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery (one causing wounds) and one count of failure to comply with an undertaking (breach of his bail on an unrelated charge). After credit for pre-sentence custody, he received a sentence of 4 years: he was sentenced to 3.5 years on the first robbery, 2 years consecutive […]
11.
R. v. Perkins, 2017 ONCA 152 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for Ontario
2017-02-22 | 16 pages | cited by 14 documents
AI-generated
A request to reopen a sentence appeal was denied. The court ruled it has no jurisdiction to revisit appeals decided on their merits and declined to expand its powers. Finality in the criminal process was emphasized, and credit for pre-sentence custody on a quashed conviction was deemed unwarranted.
Appeal Criminal or statutory infractions Practice and procedure Sentencing
Criminal procedure — Appeals — Jurisdiction — Finality of appeals — Jurisdiction to reopen appeals decided on their merits — Criminal Code jurisdiction limited to statutory appeal rights — Does the Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to reopen a decided sentence appeal based on fresh circumstances? — Rule in R. v. Rhingo upholding finality of appeals already determined on merits
Statutory interpretation — Criminal Code section 683(3) — Relationship with Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure — Statutory limits on appeals — Does section 683(3) allow appellate courts to reopen criminal appeals based on new facts or procedural irregularities? — No authority to expand appeal rights beyond Criminal Code provisions, as held in R. v. Codina
Evidence — New evidence on appeal — Relevance of quashed convictions to active sentence appeals — Is fresh evidence of an unrelated overturned conviction sufficient to reopen a sentence appeal? — Principle of finality disfavors reopening appeals for facts occurring after the original determination, as per R. v. Wilson and R. v. Rhingo
Evidence — Pre-sentence custody — Allocation of custody credits between convictions — Can pre-sentence custody served for a now-quashed conviction be reallocated to an active sentence? — "Banking" custody credits disallowed — Sentencing principle limits credit reallocation to circumstances where charges were contemporaneously dismissed or stayed
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[…] additional credit for pre-sentence custody deducted from his six year sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and one count of failing to comply with a probation order because he accumulated pre-sentence custody on unrelated charges that were ultimately stayed. […] on unrelated charges cannot be “banked”. In cases where the offender, on appeal, has been given credit for pre-sentence custody served in relation to another offence (such as R. v. Reid, 2005 CanLII 14964 (ON CA) , [2005] O.J. No. 1790 (C.A.) and R. v. Tsui, 2005 ONCA 623), that time had not been credited to a […]
12.
R. v. Latif, 2019 ONCA 309 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for Ontario
2019-04-17 | 5 pages | cited by 4 documents
AI-generated
The Court ruled that time served for unrelated or overturned convictions cannot be credited towards sentencing for other offences, as it would distort the sentencing regime. The appeal was allowed only to set aside the victim surcharge, with the remainder of the sentence upheld.
Appeal Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Victim surcharge — Appellant sought leave to appeal sentence, including the imposition of a victim surcharge — Crown conceded that the victim surcharge should be set aside — Should the victim surcharge imposed on the appellant be set aside? — Victim surcharge set aside; appeal otherwise dismissed
Statutory interpretation — Sentencing — Pre-sentence custody — Appellant argued for credit of custodial time served for unrelated or overturned convictions — Whether custodial time for unrelated or interconnected convictions can be credited toward sentencing for other offences — Section 719(3) of the Criminal Code prohibits credit for unrelated custodial time
Evidence — Sentencing — Pre-sentence custody calculation — Appellant challenged the sentencing judge’s calculation of pre-sentence custody credit — Whether the sentencing judge erred in calculating pre-sentence custody credit for the Vaughan Offences — Sentencing judge correctly applied enhanced credit at 2:1 for pre-sentence custody; no error found
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[…] to a totally unrelated conviction” strongly suggests that where the flaw is in relation to a related or interconnected conviction, a court can take into account “banked” custodial time served as part of the sentence for one offence when calculating the pre-sentence custody for purposes of sentencing on another offence. […] to the particular offence under consideration”: para. 45; followed in R. v. Perkins, 2017 ONCA 152 , 347 C.C.C. (3d) 58, at paras. 30-33 , and in R. v. Barnett, 2017 ONCA 897 , in respect of time served following an unrelated conviction as distinct from the treatment of time spent in pre-sentence custody: paras. 30 and 33. […]
13.
R v Meyers, 2012 SKCA 98 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan
2012-10-22 | 7 pages | cited by 7 documents
AI-generated
The Court dismissed an appeal challenging convictions for assault and other charges, finding the accused's self-defence claim failed due to excessive force, provocation, and lack of credibility. The sentence was deemed fit given the circumstances and the accused's criminal history. Fresh evidence was also rejected as immaterial.
Appeal Criminal or statutory infractions Defences Evidence
Criminal infractions — Assault causing bodily harm — Confinement — Uttering threats — Failure to comply with recognizance — Appellant convicted of multiple Criminal Code offenses, including assault causing bodily harm and confinement — Whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s self-defence claim or in assessing the credibility of the complainant — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 34(1), 34(2), 145(3), 267(b), 279(2), 264.1(1)(a)
Criminal procedure — Self-defence — Section 34(1) of the Criminal Code — Appellant argued self-defence, claiming the complainant attacked him first — Trial judge found appellant initiated or provoked the assault and used excessive force — Whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the self-defence claim — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 34(1)
Criminal procedure — Fresh evidence — Appellant sought to admit fresh evidence on appeal, including medical records and receipts — Court found the evidence did not meet the threshold for admission under R. v. Palmer — Whether the proposed evidence could reasonably have affected the trial outcome — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 686(1)(b)(iii)
Evidence — Credibility — Trial judge preferred the complainant’s testimony over the appellant’s — Trial judge applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework and found the appellant’s version of events not credible — Whether the trial judge erred in assessing credibility or in failing to consider inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony — R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742
Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Remand credit — Fitness of sentence — Appellant argued for enhanced remand credit and a reduced sentence — Trial judge credited six months for remand and imposed a 27-month sentence for assault, confinement, and threats — Whether the trial judge erred in calculating remand credit or imposing an unfit sentence — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 145(3)
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[…] [24] Mr. Meyers spent 9.9 months on remand. The trial judge credited him for a full four months for yet another offence of threatening F.M. and six months credit for the balance of the time spent on remand. […]
14.
R. v. R.H.B, 2012 BCPC 499 (CanLII)
Provincial Court of British Columbia
2012-12-06 | 19 pages | cited by 2 documents
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Property offences
[…] Although R.H.B has been in jail, it is agreed that there is no credit for dead time. That dead time is being credited to another offence for which R.H.B is serving jail time. […]
15.
R. v. Ruelas, 2022 ONCA 262 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for Ontario
2022-03-31 | 5 pages | cited by 7 documents
AI-generated
The Court upheld a 3.5-year sentence for sexual assault, rejecting claims of sentencing errors but granted additional pre-sentence custody credit, reducing the effective sentence length.
Criminal or statutory infractions Interpretation
Criminal infractions — Sentencing — Mitigating factors — Rehabilitation — Appellant convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to three years, six months’ imprisonment — Did the trial judge err in failing to give effect to mitigating factors, including rehabilitation efforts and letters of support? — Trial judge entitled to assume all relevant material was filed — No error in principle affecting the sentence imposed
Evidence — Sentencing — Mitigating factors — Letters of support — Trial judge expressed unease about letters of support not post-dating arrest — Did the trial judge err in failing to raise concerns about the letters during sentencing? — Letters not equivalent to pre-sentence reports — No obligation to raise concerns during sentencing
Evidence — Sentencing principles — Restraint — Rehabilitation prospects — Appellant argued sentence failed to apply the principle of restraint given unrelated prior record and rehabilitation potential — Did the trial judge err in applying sentencing principles? — Sentence deemed fit and consistent with relevant principles
Criminal procedure — Pre-sentence custody — Credit for unrelated charges — Appellant sought additional credit for pre-sentence custody related to unrelated charges — Should additional credit have been granted? — Court allowed credit for 32 additional days of pre-sentence custody on a 1.5:1 basis
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[…] [8] Finally, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in failing to give the appellant credit for pre-sentence custody arising from the unrelated charges he was facing at the time of sentencing. […] Fresh evidence demonstrates that the appellant received credit for only 45 days of pre-sentence custody when sentenced for those charges. […]
16.
R. v. Chartrand, 2025 MBPC 80 (CanLII)
Provincial Court of Manitoba
2025-12-11 | 10 pages
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Sentencing — Possession for the purpose of trafficking — Cocaine and hydromorphone
[…] [27] In allowing the Crown’s appeal, the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that no credit for pre-sentence custody should be given where there is no connection between the pre-sentence custody time and the charges for which he was sentenced. […] At paragraph 16, the court stated, “It was an error in principle to grant any credit for pre-sentence custody in relation to other charges unrelated to the charges upon which he was sentenced.” […]
17.
R. v. Smith, 2009 ABCA 42 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal of Alberta
2009-02-09 | 4 pages | cited by 1 document
AI-generated
Appeal Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Offences against persons — Kidnapping — Sentencing — Considerations
[…] [12] In considering credit for the several months spent by Smith in the Calgary Remand Centre, the sentencing judge held that the youth matters were unrelated and should be served prior to the commencement of the sentence for the subject offences. […] [16] The sentencing judge carefully considered pre-sentence custody. He did not give credit for the period between January 25 to June 27, 2008, because the accused was serving a custodial sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act. This sentence arose from unrelated offences, so that it was reasonable that the sentence […]
18.
R. v. Pynn, 2015 CanLII 14065 (NL SC)
Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador
2015-03-19 | 20 pages
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions Practice and procedure Sentencing
Criminal law — Murder — Attempted murder — Assault — Assault with weapon
[…] [66] Mr. Pynn will receive 1.5 days to 1 credit for time served; less seven months, which he was serving for another offence concurrent with his time on remand. […] Reducing this amount by the seven months, or 210 days, he was serving for another offence, leaves three years and 13 days on remand. As already noted, the exercise of granting credit is not a mathematical formula, so Mr. Pynn will be credited with remand time of three years. […]
19.
R. v. J.L.G., 2006 ABPC 51 (CanLII)
Provincial Court
2006-02-16 | 40 pages | cited by 5 documents
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Robbery — Armed robbery — Sentencing
[…] I am further satisfied that, as a result of those materially worse conditions, Mr. J.L.G. should be granted credit for pre-sentence custody something in excess of the usual two for one credit. […] The overcrowding was a constant factor in the entirety of his remand time. However, the transfers and resultant medical problems which were the most significant consequence of that overcrowding, did not plaque him the entire time he was on remand. […]
20.
R v. Rigby, 2017 ONSC 7842 (CanLII)
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
2017-10-10 | 4 pages
AI-generated
The Court sentenced the Accused to 12 months’ further imprisonment plus probation for endangering life through arson, prioritizing denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality.
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing — Arson, disregard for human life — Proportionality under s. 718.1 — What is a fit sentence for arson endangering occupants? — Aggravating factors include endangerment of two persons, death of two animals, and total destruction — Guilty plea as limited mitigation — Life maximum, no minimum — Three years’ imprisonment imposed
Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing alternatives — ss. 718.2(d), 718.2(e) — Whether less restrictive sanctions are appropriate — Court finds no sentence sufficient but for a further custodial one — Denunciation, general and specific deterrence paramount — Neighbours placed at risk and community harm emphasised — Further custodial sentence required
Criminal and statutory offences — Pre-sentence custody — Enhanced credit — How should pre-sentence custody be credited to the global sentence? — Parties agree to 24 months credit on a 1 to 1.5 basis — Time in segregation noted — Net sentence fixed at 12 months from today after credit — Credit granted
Criminal and statutory offences — Ancillary orders — Probation and orders — Should DNA order, s. 109 order for life, and restitution be imposed? — Probation two years with reporting, counselling, no incendiary items, and no contact — Restitution to insurer with no fixed payment date — Ancillary orders issued
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[…] Counsel agree that he be credited with the equivalent of 24 months pre-sentence custody, about 18 months less 2 months for an unrelated sentence served earlier this year for a balance of 16 months, which on an enhanced 1 to 1.5 scale amounts to 24 months. […] Some of that time served has been spent in segregation for reasons that did not involve misconduct by the offender. […]
21.
R v Mackinnon, 2016 SKQB 64 (CanLII)
Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan
2016-02-25 | 22 pages | cited by 5 documents
AI-generated
The Court sentenced the accused to 9 months and 23 days imprisonment for unlawful confinement, assault, and breach of recognizance, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality. Aggravating factors included the domestic nature of the offences and significant victim impact, while mitigating factors included a guilty plea and remorse.
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal infractions — Sentencing — Unlawful confinement — Assault — Breach of recognizance — Offender confined complainant for several hours, repeatedly assaulted her, and breached conditions of recognizance — Aggravating factors included domestic violence, significant emotional harm to the victim, and prior criminal record — Mitigating factors included guilty plea, remorse, and compliance with release conditions — Fit sentence determined to be 9 months and 23 days incarceration, followed by probation — Principles of proportionality, denunciation, and deterrence applied
Criminal procedure — Pre-trial custody credit — Enhanced credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code — Offender detained under s. 524(4) or (8) of the Criminal Code — Whether offender entitled to 1.5:1 credit for time spent in custody — Court held offender entitled only to 1:1 credit due to statutory limitations — 67 days of pre-trial custody credited at 1:1 ratio
Criminal infractions — Ancillary orders — DNA order — Firearm prohibition — Victim surcharge — Court imposed DNA order under s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code — Ten-year firearm prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code — Victim surcharge of $600 imposed — Ancillary orders deemed proportionate and necessary for public safety and accountability
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[…] However, Mr. MacKinnon was for a portion of that remand time given credit for the remand time in relation to another offence. […]
22.
R. v. Broderick, 2016 ONCJ 23 (CanLII)
Ontario Court of Justice
2016-01-06 | 6 pages
AI-generated
The Court sentenced the Accused to one year minus pre-sentence custody for aggravated assault causing significant injuries. Denunciation and deterrence were prioritized, while restraint was exercised due to mitigating factors, including lack of prior violent offenses, guilty plea, and family obligations. Probationary conditions and restitution were imposed.
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing — Aggravated assault — Proportionality and denunciation — Whether one year of custody is proportionate given the gravity and the offender’s responsibility — Serious public assault causing broken jaws and wounding — Guilty plea credit reduced by late timing — Mature offender with record — Emphasis on denunciation and deterrence — Sentence of 12 months imposed
Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing — Pre-sentence custody credit — Calculation of enhanced credit at 1.5 to 1 and deduction for time under sentence on unrelated matters — Whether intermittent sentence appropriate where fit sentence is 12 months — Credit of 267 days applied to 178 days served — Remainder of 98 days to serve
Criminal and statutory offences — Sentencing — Probation and restitution — Whether probation with reparations and protective conditions should follow custody — Three years’ probation ordered to make reparations and ensure protection of the victim — No-contact and 100 metres conditions — Reporting and cooperation with probation — Restitution of $713 to victim required — Probation for three years with restitution ordered
Criminal and statutory offences — Ancillary orders — Weapons prohibition and DNA order — Criminal Code, s. 109 — Whether lifetime prohibition and DNA order should be made following aggravated assault — Mandatory prohibition for firearms and related items imposed for life — Victim surcharge set and time to pay extended — DNA order granted and lifetime prohibition made
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[…] [13] Accordingly, the sentence that I would have imposed but for the pre-sentence custody is one of 12 months jail. Mr. Broderick is entitled to credit for pre-sentence custody from his arrest on May 29, 2015 to today’s date, less 45 days for the period when he was serving a sentence imposed for unrelated matters in […] Although defence counsel has urged me to deduct only 30 days to reflect the probable amount of time that Mr. Broderick would have actually served with credit for earned remission, I decline to do so. The actual sentence was one of 45 days jail. […]
23.
R. v. Bacon, 2010 BCPC 325 (CanLII)
Provincial Court of British Columbia
2010-12-17 | 31 pages | cited by 19 documents
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions
Criminal law — Weapons — Firearms — Sentencing — Considerations
[…] [23] In cases where an offender is in custody on several unrelated matters awaiting trial, there is a concern that the offender will seek and get credit for the same pre-sentencing custody – double counting – undermining the sentencing process and diminishing respect for the criminal justice system. […] If the accused is in custody on unrelated matters, the factual foundation for crediting pre-sentence custody does not exist. […]
24.
R v Abdulkadir, 2018 ABPC 268 (CanLII)
Provincial Court
2018-11-20 | 44 pages
AI-generated
Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal law — Sentencing — Appeals — Sexual offences — Sexual assault
[…] While on bail prior to trial he committed other unrelated offences and was detained in custody. The trial judge credited his pre-sentence custody for the time spent in custody on the unrelated charges. […] He will not be given credit for any time related to the pre-sentence custody for the other unrelated charges. […]
25.
R v Keepness, 2014 SKCA 110 (CanLII)
Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan
2014-10-29 | 56 pages | cited by 36 documents
AI-generated
The Court upheld the conviction and adjusted the sentence, clarifying that pre-trial custody credit under the Criminal Code cannot apply to time served for unrelated offences. The Crown's appeal partially succeeded, reducing the sentence to 14 years and 1 month. Dissent emphasized proportionality and fairness in sentencing.
Appeal Criminal or statutory infractions Sentencing
Criminal procedure — Conviction appeals — Reasonableness of verdict — Vetrovec caution — Credibility of accomplice witnesses — Trial judge convicted the accused of manslaughter and aggravated assault as a party under ss. 21(2) and 22 of the Criminal Code — Did the trial judge err in assessing witness credibility and applying the Vetrovec caution? — Standard of review for unreasonable verdicts under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code
Evidence — Witness credibility — Accomplice testimony — Vetrovec caution — Trial judge relied on testimony of accomplices and corroborative evidence to convict the accused — Did the trial judge err in finding the evidence of accomplices credible and reliable? — Principles governing the application of the Vetrovec caution and corroboration of accomplice testimony
Criminal procedure — Sentencing — Parity principle — Culpability of co-accused — Accused sentenced to 15 years for manslaughter and aggravated assault, reduced to 10.5 years after pre-sentence custody credit — Did the trial judge err in assessing the accused’s culpability compared to co-accused? — Principles of parity and proportionality in sentencing under s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code
Statutory interpretation — Pre-sentence custody credit — Section 719(3) of the Criminal Code — Trial judge granted credit for time served on unrelated offences — Did the trial judge err in interpreting s. 719(3) to allow credit for unrelated sentences? — Interpretation of “as a result of the offence” in s. 719(3) and its application to pre-sentence custody credit
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[…] If an accused is in custody on unrelated matters, the factual foundation for crediting pre-sentence custody does not exist. […] [119] The majority in Wilson refused to grant the accused credit in the particular appeal before them because the accused sought to have the Court take into account time spent serving a sentence for another offence, which was stayed after the accused had been sentenced for the offence for which remand credit was being […]
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