CAN ORDINARY PEOPLE CHANGE THE LAWS USING THE COURT SYSTEM? NO! A.I. CHARTER CHALLENGE (S.52 ) TIME.
- Stephen Morris
- May 17
- 19 min read
DATE: May 17, 2026
RE: Dismantling Legal Defeatism — The Structural Reality of Citizen-Led Lawmaking
I. THE CAMPAIGN CORE: THE BIG LIE OF LEGAL IMPOTENCE
The most pervasive narrative shielding bad governance from public accountability is the myth of legal detachment. The ordinary person is routinely told that changing an unjust or erroneous law is an exclusively political, multi-million-dollar game played behind the closed doors of legislative assemblies or corporate law firms—utterly beyond the reach of the sovereign citizen.
This is a structural falsehood.
As established by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession Reference [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, the Canadian legal architecture is not a closed circuit. It is built upon a dynamic, unwritten foundation where Democracy and the Rule of Law are profoundly interrelated counterweights. Law is not a static rule book delivered from a detached high command; it is an ongoing, reciprocal negotiation between the state and the citizen. When ordinary people detect that a legal mechanism is broken, unconstitutional, or functioning as an administrative shield for state overreach, they possess explicit, legal pathways to bypass political stagnation and force systemic renewal.
II. THE STRATEGIC MAP: THE THREE CITIZEN PATHWAYS TO FORCE CHANGE
When a law is broken, citizens do not have to wait for an election. They can “Activate” the constitutional architecture through three specific, structural mechanisms (or “Weaponizing”, to the standardized archaic, luddite government resisting positive change):
1. The Juridical Trigger: Activating Unwritten Principles
· The Legal Reality: As highlighted in Toronto (City) v. Ontario [2021], the "democratic principle" serves as the baseline against which all legislatures operate. It ensures that the state cannot arbitrarily strip away political freedoms or pass legislation that cuts off access to justice.
· The Execution: An ordinary individual can file an application in a superior court under Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, or Section 7 of the Charter (Fundamental Justice), arguing that a facially neutral rule has overstepped its legal boundaries (Paul Daly, 2017). The court is constitutionally compelled to audit the law. If it lacks internal logic or operates arbitrarily, the court will strike it down, bypassing the legislature entirely.
However, there is one small Caveat – has this ever been successfully accomplished?
The short answer is no, this has never been successfully done in the way it is described. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly ruled against this exact framework.
The premise outlined in your prompt contains a major legal error regarding how unwritten constitutional principles operate in Canada. Here is the reality of how the law actually works, using the very case cited:
The Reality of Toronto (City) v. Ontario [2021]
While the prompt states that the "democratic principle" allows courts to bypass the legislature and strike down laws, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled the exact opposite in Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34.
In a 5–4 majority decision, the Supreme Court held that:
· No Free-Standing Power: Unwritten constitutional principles (such as democracy, federalism, or the rule of law) cannot be used as an independent, standalone basis to invalidate or strike down legislation.
· Interpretation Only: These unwritten principles are strictly interpretive tools. They can be used to contextually understand the written text of the Constitution or fill minor gaps, but they do not overrule explicit legislative authority granted by the written Constitution.
When Can a Court "Strike Down" a Law?
For an ordinary individual to successfully use Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to strike down a law, the challenge must be rooted in a breach of the written text of the Constitution or the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (such as Freedom of Expression under Section 2(b) or Fundamental Justice under Section 7).
If a law is facially neutral but operates arbitrarily or lacks internal logic, a court can strike it down, but only if that arbitrariness amounts to a violation of a specific written provision—most commonly Section 7 of the Charter (the right to life, liberty, and security of the person).
Historical Examples of Successful Section 7 / Section 52 Strikes:
When courts have bypassed legislatures to strike down laws due to "arbitrariness" or "overbreadth," they did so using the written text of Section 7, not unwritten principles:
· 1988 (R. v. Morgentaler): The Supreme Court struck down Canada’s abortion laws under Section 52 because the procedural hoops required to obtain a legal abortion were arbitrary and fundamentally interfered with a woman's security of the person (Section 7).
· 2013 (Canada v. Bedford): The Supreme Court struck down Canada’s prostitution laws. The court found that while the laws were meant to prevent public nuisance, they actively forced sex workers into dangerous, unregulated environments, making the laws "grossly disproportionate" and "arbitrary" under Section 7.
· 2015 (Carter v. Canada): The Supreme Court struck down the Criminal Code prohibition on medical assistance in dying (MAID), ruling that a blanket ban was overbroad and failed to comply with the principles of fundamental justice under Section 7.
S. 52 Summary
If an individual goes to a superior court today arguing that a law should be struck down solely because it violates an unwritten principle like democracy, the court will dismiss the application based on the precedent set in Toronto (City) v. Ontario [2021]. To successfully trigger Section 52, the individual must prove that the law violates the written text of the Constitution.
2. Strategic Disobedience and the "Good-Faith" Appellate Shield
· The Legal Reality: The law progresses because individuals refuse to comply with erroneous administrative mandates. In Mercer v. Yukon [2023], the courts reaffirmed that while legislatures can delegate emergency or bureaucratic powers to the executive, all holders of public power remain accountable. * The Execution: By challenging an administrative fine, an arbitrary regulatory sanction, or a non-compliant tribunal order, an individual forces a superior court review. When an independent advocate stands up and exposes that a regulation causes systemic harm or lacks a rational connection to public safety, the ensuing judgment becomes binding common law—effectively rewriting the state's operational rules.
3. Forcing the "Dialogue" Rule (R. v. Kanyinda, 2026 SCC 7)
· The Legal Reality: The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the democratic principle "encourages remedies that allow the democratic process of consultation and dialogue to flourish" (Paul Joffe, 2000).
· The Execution: When Ms. Kanyinda challenged her exclusion from a provincial program, she didn't wait for a political party to champion her cause. She utilized the equality provisions of the Charter to show that the facially neutral rule caused real-world, compounded disadvantages. The Supreme Court responded by immediately "reading in" an entirely new class of protected individuals into the text of the regulation—proving that a single individual's legal challenge can instantly rewrite provincial law.
III. DISMANTLING THE "TRIBUNAL TRAP"
A primary method the administrative state uses to exhaust ordinary citizens is the Tribunal Trap—shunting real legal disputes into hyper-specialized boards, commissioners, and parallel panels (Paul Daly, 2013). The state designs these boards to look like absolute final authorities, operating under opaque guidelines to discourage further challenge.
Traditional Fallacy (Statist Propaganda/Sophistry/Positivism) | The Constitutional Fact (The Litigant’s Tool) |
Administrative tribunals have the final, unreviewable say over how their internal guidelines apply to you. | The Rule of Law requires superior courts to act as structural gatekeepers, ensuring no board ever oversteps its statutory authority. |
You must accept the existing wording of a provincial regulation as written until parliament amends it. | Under Section 24(1) and Section 52, any court of competent jurisdiction can immediately alter, read down, or strike out non-compliant text. |
Legal change requires institutional backing, commercial credentials, or specialized insurance. | Sovereignty resides in the people, meaning independent, self-styled logic stands equal to Crown counsel before the Bench. |
IV. THE CAMPAIGN: LAW IS COOL REASON, NOT COMPULSION BY DORKY “ELITES”
To tell the people the truth is to remind them of the core maxim: Lex est ratio summa quae jubet ea quae facienda sunt et prohibet contraria (Law is the highest reason, which commands what must be done and prohibits the contrary).
If a statute or a crown opinion lacks internal coherence, relies on fabricated parameters, or strips away fundamental justice to protect administrative convenience, it ceases to function as legitimate law. It becomes mere coercion.
The legal process is not a closed political theater. Every time a self-represented citizen logs onto CanLII, isolates a structural contradiction in a state factum, files a clear application, and forces a judge to rule on the black-letter limits of administrative power, that citizen is actively changing the law. We are not the passive subjects of the legal apparatus; we must become its architects, dismantling the dork-ocracy of our pituitary-less neighbours.
MEMORANDUM ENDS
SOURCES
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legitimacy — constitutional — political — secession — society
Constitution
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The Case for a Canadian Nondelegation Doctrine, 2019 CanLIIDocs 4631
James Johnson – UBC Law Review
100 pages
separation of powers — nondelegation doctrine — constitutional — government — institutional
Constitution Public administration
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The 2018 Toronto Municipal Election: Judicial Failure to Protect the Structure of the Canadian Constitution, 2020 CanLIIDocs 3195
James Johnson – Constitutional Forum
15 pages
democratic principle — legitimacy — electoral process
Constitution Public administration
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Canadians are a Sovereign People: How the Supreme Court Should Approach the Reference on Quebec Secession, 1997 CanLIIDocs 100
Robert Howse, Alissa Malkin – Canadian Bar Review
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secession
Constitution
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Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on Standard of Review and Reasonableness, 2013 CanLIIDocs 500
Paul Daly – [Source not specified]
52 pages
reasonableness — standard of review — contextual — correctness
Administrative remedies Technology
[…] Moreover, it is reasserting itself in a way that has the potential to be consistent with the two principles said to hold the Dunsmuir project together, “the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle”. 31 The thesis of this paper is that the rule of law and democracy can and should now be used to guide the […] On the one hand, the rule of law requires courts to ensure that statutory decision-makers “do not overstep their legal authority”. 33 On the other hand, the democratic principle “finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers” […]
6.
Unfinished Business in Unwritten Justice: Unwritten Constitutional Principles After Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2024 CanLIIDocs 2271
Andre Matheusik – Alberta Law Review
59 pages
majority — invalidate legislation — text — constitutional provisions — federalism
Constitution
[…] B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS UCPs identified by the Supreme Court post-1982 “include federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, ... respect for minorities,” 26 the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, 27 and the sovereignty of Parliament. 28 This list is not exhaustive. 29 The […] within federal legislative power; (2) the provincial Legislatures have authority over all laws within provincial legislative power; and (3) one of the various amending procedures is available to repeal or amend any law that is outside the competence of both the federal Parliament and the provincial Legislatures,” s 12:4). […]
7.
Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on Standard of Review and Reasonableness, 2017 CanLIIDocs 346
Paul Daly – McGill Law Journal
58 pages
reasonableness — standard of review — correctness — contextual factors — administrative
Administrative remedies
[…] Moreover, context is reasserting itself in a way that has the potential to be consistent with the two principles said to hold the Dunsmuir project together: “the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle.”30 The thesis of this article is that the rule of law and democracy can and should now be used to guide the […] On the one hand, the rule of law requires courts to ensure that administrative decision makers “do not overstep their legal authority.”32 On the other hand, the democratic principle “finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and endow them with broad […]
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Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 CanLII 793 (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 217
Supreme Court of Canada
1998-08-20 | 93 pages | cited by 1,257 documents
AI-generated
Constitution Practice and procedure
Constitutional law — International law
Courts — Supreme Court of Canada — Reference jurisdiction — Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S‐26, s. 53.
[…] 65 In institutional terms, democracy means that each of the provincial legislatures and the federal Parliament is elected by popular franchise. […] The democracy principle, as we have emphasized, cannot be invoked to trump the principles of federalism and rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. […]
9.
Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34 (CanLII), [2021] 2 SCR 845
Supreme Court of Canada
2021-10-01 | 109 pages | cited by 204 documents
AI-generated
Constitution Public administration Rights and freedoms
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of expression — Municipal elections — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(b) — Local Government Act, 2018, S.O. 2018, c. 11.
[…] [173] This Court expressly endorsed the unwritten principles of democracy as the “baseline against which the framers of our Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it, have always operated” (Secession Reference, at para. 62); the rule of law as “a fundamental postulate of our constitutional […] Council, [1998] ZACC 17, 1999 (1) S.A. 374, at para. 58 (legality)); Germany (Elfes Case, BVerfG, 1 BvR 253/56, Decision of January 16, 1957 (rule of law and social welfare state)); and India (Kesavananda v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461, at pp. 1899-1900 (secularism, democracy and individual freedom)). […]
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Assessing the Delgamuukw Principles: National Implications and Potential Effects in Quebec, 2000 CanLIIDocs 59
Paul Joffe – McGill Law Journal
106 pages
peoples — self-determination — government — constitutional — aboriginal
Indigenous peoples
[…] rights, democracy and the rule of law are profoundly interrelated. Underlying constitutional principles, such as democracy and the protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights "infuse our Constitution and breathe life into it.*"" In the Supreme Court's own words, "The principles dictate major elements of the architecture of […] elude the following: i) the principle of democracy, as an underlying constitutional principle, means more than majority rule (ibid at para. 116) and is "an important remedial consideration" (at para. 117); ii) the democratic principle "encourages remedies that allow the democratic process of consultation and dialogue to […]
11.
MacKinnon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 422 (CanLII)
Federal Court
2025-03-06 | 81 pages | cited by 11 documents
AI-generated
Administrative remedies Constitution Judicial review Practice and procedure
Administrative law — Judicial review — Jurisdiction of Supreme or County Court
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Standing
[…] to the Governor General to prorogue Parliament would also be consistent with the evolving view that “all holders of public power must be accountable for their exercises of power, a principle that rests at the heart of our democratic governance and the rule of law”: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Canadian Council […] above are that: (a) Parliament, not the executive, is supreme, and the executive cannot fetter Parliament’s law-making power; (b) to maintain its authority to govern, the government must remain accountable to, and retain the confidence of, Parliament; (c) the rule of law is intended to shield citizens from arbitrary state […]
12.
The Separation of Powers in Liberal Polity: Vriend v. Alberta, 1999 CanLIIDocs 62
Frederick C DeCoste – McGill Law Journal
39 pages
democratic — separation of powers — accountability — sovereignty — branches
Rights and freedoms
[…] " See WE. Scheuerman, 'The Rule of Law at Century's End" (1997) 25 Political Theory 740; J. Hampton, "Democracy and the Rule of Law" in Shapiro, supra note 25 at 13; and C.H. Mcllwain, 'The Reconstruction of Liberalism" in Mdllwain, supra note 28 at 290-93. […] This in turn is so because the morality of government by consent, which is democracy, requires that " Vriend, supra note 3 at 534, Cory J.: "It has not yet been necessary to decide ... whether the Charter might impose positive obligations on the legislatures or on Parliament" "Ibid. at 566. […]
13.
The Quebec Secession Reference: Goodbye to Part V?, 1999 CanLIIDocs 283
Donna Greschner – Constitutional Forum
19 pages
referendum — veto — political — duty to negotiate — constitutional change
Constitution
[…] Moreover, several legislatures have supplemented Part V with statutory requirements to hold referenda on constitutional change.' These statutory promises to facilitate direct democracy contributed to the demise of the Charlottetown Accord. […] It describes four foundational principles that underlie constitutional rules and practice: federalism, democracy, constitution-alism and the Rule of Law, and the protection of minorities. […]
14.
Un-Democratizing the City? Unwritten Constitutional Principles and Ontario’s Strong Mayor Powers, 2024 CanLIIDocs 3273
Alexandra Flynn – Supreme Court Law Review
44 pages
municipalities — unwritten constitutional principles — legislation — federalism — majority
Constitution Municipalities Rights and freedoms
[…] and accountability of public institutions that are created under the Constitution.135 In order for the political system to possess legitimacy, there must be interaction between the rule of law and the democratic principle.136 To the SCC, democracy requires a commitment to acknowledgment of dissenting voices.137 […] A challenge to Bill 39 would also defend the rule of law. The rule of law provides citizens with a stable, predictable, orderly society, whereby legal rules including unwritten constitutional norms are followed.140 The SCC has set out the elements of the rule of law, and the first two are: supremacy of law over the acts of […]
15.
How the United States Supports Democratic Development Overseas, 2008 CanLIIDocs 358
Keith Schulz – Canadian Parliamentary Review
11 pages
democracy — USAID — governance assistance
Public administration
[…] A relatively new actor in democracy promotion efforts is the United States Congress. In 2005, the House of Representatives created the House Democracy Assistance Commission to promote strong and effective democratic legislatures in many different parts of the globe. […] its democracy and governance pro-grams as “technical assistance and other support to strengthen capacity of reform-minded governments, nongovernmental actors, and/or citizens in order to de-velop and support democratic states and institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens.”5 USAID’s democracy and […]
16.
'Old Habits Die Hard' - Reflections on the Scope of the Royal Prerogative Following Turp v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2013 CanLIIDocs 719
Jarrad Harvey – Constitutional Forum
17 pages
executive decision-making — withdraw — government decision-making — greenhouse gas emissions — environmental
Environment Public administration
[…] B Th e rule of law argument Turp’s fi rst argument was that the withdrawal from the Protocol violated the KPIA and the rule of law. 48 Th e rule of law posits that everyone, including citizens and government bodies alike, are bound by a state’s laws. […] jurisprudence of cases considering when an Act of Parliament will implicitly constrain the use of the royal prerogative. 62 While the rule of law as a doctrine is well-entrenched, Canadian courts have exercised circumspection when consider- ing when and to what extent legislation limits the scope of the royal prerogative. […]
17.
Karlsruhe-Luxembourg: A New Distance after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty Ruling, 2012 CanLIIDocs 399
Francesca Astengo – Revue québécoise de droit international
35 pages
integration — constitutional — democratic — national
International law
[…] the ECJ demonstrated its commitment to the 33 promotion of the democratic principle within the European Union. The general idea confirmed in the following jurisprudence is that procedures of the EU are based on representative democracy, as the European Parliament is comprised of the representatives of the Union’s citizens. […] In the EJC’s perspective of a quasi-federal European system that relies on legal analogies of constitutional rather that international law, the European Parliament plays the crucial role of a fully-fledged legislature. It fulfills the classic role of parliament in a democratic system: acting as the representative body of […]
18.
Rethinking the Relationship Between International and Domestic Law, 2008 CanLIIDocs 151
Armand Claude de Mestral, Evan Fox-Decent – McGill Law Journal
136 pages
treaty — international — domestic — treaties — implementation
International law
[…] This is a valuable first step, but before turning to a discussion of where we go from here, it is helpful to have in mind the role played by legislatures of other liberal democracies in the treaty-making process, as well as the role of Parliament in treaty making prior to 1968. […] In an increasingly globalized world, the rule of law does not stop at the border. The contribution of the (international) rule of law to democracy brings us to the democratic principle and the issue of how international law-making can best be squared with it. […]
19.
The Judges Reference and the Secession Reference at Twenty: Reassessing the Supreme Court of Canada's Unfinished Unwritten Constitutional Principles Project, 2019 CanLIIDocs 2091
Alyn James Johnson – Alberta Law Review
75 pages
unwritten principles — constitutional — separation of powers
Constitution
[…] The rule of law does not exhaust the content of the separation of powers. The separation of powers also has important affinities with the democratic principle, as is evident in New Brunswick Broadcasting, supra note 5, where institutional separation requires the courts to respect the internal processes of the legislature, […] The principle of constitutionalism and the rule of law ensures that the relationships between citizens, between citizens and the state, and between the various levels of governments are all controlled by law and is “necessarily predicated on the idea that the political representatives of the people of a province have the […]
20.
Democracy Watch v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 158 (CanLII)
Federal Court of Appeal
2024-10-02 | 50 pages | cited by 16 documents
AI-generated
Administrative remedies Judicial review Practice and procedure
Federal Court jurisdiction — Appeal Division
Practice — Partial stay of proceedings
Construction of statutes — Conflict of interest — Federal Courts Act, s. 18.1(4)(a), (b) or (e)
[…] [21] Third, the applicant argues that the COIA is quasi-constitutional because it furthers the unwritten constitutional principles of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. Since there are no internal appeal mechanisms or alternative recourse other than judicial review, Parliament cannot shield the Commissioner […] Judicial review seeks to address an underlying tension between the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle, which finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers. […]
21.
Mercer v Yukon (Government of), 2023 YKSC 59 (CanLII)
Supreme Court of Yukon
2023-11-03 | 55 pages | cited by 2 documents
AI-generated
The Court upheld the validity of Yukon’s emergency legislation allowing substantial delegation of legislative power to the executive during emergencies, ruling such powers consistent with constitutional principles and jurisprudence. Judicial remedies remain for orders exceeding statutory limits. The plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge was dismissed.
Constitution Interpretation Practice and procedure
Constitution — Delegation of legislative authority — Emergency measures — Civil Emergency Measures Act (CEMA) — Constitutionality of shifting legislative powers to executive — Lack of legislative oversight — Separation of powers — Rule of law — Responsible government — Does CEMA contravene constitutional principles or the Yukon Act by improperly delegating legislative powers? — Canadian jurisprudence supports broad delegation subject to statutory limits and judicial review
Constitution — Judicial review — Section 10 of Civil Emergency Measures Act (CEMA) — Limitation of Crown liability — Immunity for government actions during emergencies — Core jurisdiction of superior courts under s. 38 of the Yukon Act — Does section 10 unconstitutionally bar remedies like injunctions or mandamus? — Courts retain jurisdiction for declarations, certiorari, and other remedies — Legislative authority over causes of action confirmed
Constitution — Unwritten constitutional principles — Democracy, rule of law, separation of powers — Civil Emergency Measures Act (CEMA) — Can unwritten principles invalidate legislation independently of constitutional text? — Supreme Court of Canada confirmed unwritten principles can guide interpretation but cannot alone invalidate legislation — Principles of democracy and parliamentary sovereignty deemed consistent with CEMA’s framework
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[…] The plaintiffs say the Yukon Act, SC 2002, c 7 (the “Yukon Act ”), including the preamble referring to responsible government, creates a legislature designed to make policy choices in the context of the rule of law, democracy, Parliamentary sovereignty, responsible government and the separation of powers, some of the […] the legislation, the Supreme Court of Canada first referenced its previous decisions where it has recognized that our Constitution describes “an architecture of the institutions of state and of their relationship to citizens that connotes certain underlying principles ... such as democracy and the rule of law” (para. 49). […]
22.
“Grand Entrance Hall,” Back Door or Foundation Stone? the Role of Constitutional Principles in Construing and Applying the Constitution of Canada, 2001 CanLIIDocs 399
Warren J Newman – Supreme Court Law Review
67 pages
proofs — constitutional principles — unwritten — political — text
Constitution
[…] processes in law-making), the rule of law should also englobe a substantive protection against purported arbitrariness by Parliament or a legislature in enacting laws that abrogate previous contractual undertakings by government or that remove related causes of action and thus ancillary access to the courts for redress. […] The rule of law requires that “the relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated by law.” 93 This principle should not be construed as “having put an end to another constitutional principle, namely the supremacy of Parliament or the supremacy of legislatures when acting in their own domain.” 94 In […]
23.
“A Constitution Similar in Principle to That of the United Kingdom": The Preamble, Constitutional Principles, and a Sustainable Jurisprudence, 1976 CanLIIDocs 103
Peter C Oliver – McGill Law Journal
99 pages
reflective equilibrium — sustainable jurisprudence — approach — principle of judicial independence — unwritten
Constitution
[…] law, and (so it was said) in the good sense and tolerance of the British people and Parliament. In cases such as Entick v. Carrington,31 British judges ensured that the executive respected the rule of law and the liberties of subjects.32 Courts would not, however, invalidate acts of Parliament; Parliament remained supreme. […] Of the four main principles identified in this case (democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, federalism, protection of minorities), democracy and constitutionalism and the rule of law related most directly to the preambular phrase “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”. […]
24.
Imperial Tobacco and Trial Lawyers: An Unstable and Unsuccessful Retreat, 2019 CanLIIDocs 2839
Alyn James Johnson – Alberta Law Review
48 pages
unwritten principles — constitutional — rule
Commerce and industry Constitution Evidence and procedure
[…] (Attorney General). 28 In that decision, the abstract principle of representative democracy leads to the recognition of the concrete “structural imperative” that “neither Parliament nor the provincial legislatures may enact legislation the effect of which would be to substantially interfere with” free political speech. 29 […] that the rule of law is “a fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure,” and “requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order.” 99 In the Secession Reference, the Supreme Court adds that “the rule of law […]
25.
“A Constitution Similar in Principle to That of the United Kingdom”: The Preamble, Constitutional Principles, and a Sustainable Jurisprudence, 2019 CanLIIDocs 4488
Peter C Oliver – McGill Law Journal
99 pages
reflective equilibrium — approach — sustainable jurisprudence — principle of judicial independence
Constitution
[…] law, and (so it was said) in the good sense and tolerance of the British people and Parliament. In cases such as Entick v. Carrington,31 British judges ensured that the executive respected the rule of law and the liberties of subjects.32 Courts would not, however, invalidate acts of Parliament; Parliament remained supreme. […] Of the four main principles identified in this case (democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, federalism, protection of minorities), democracy and constitutionalism and the rule of law related most directly to the preambular phrase “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”. […]
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